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Abstract. This paper studies a simple setting in which the contractual arrange-
ments which determine the incentives for agents are not designed by a single
central planner, but are themselves the outcome of a game among multiple non-
cooperatively acting principals. The notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilib-
rium is introduced to predict the outcome of the contract-design game among
principals. Symmetric pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria may not ex-
ist in perfectly symmetric environments. In a symmetric Epsilon Contracting
Equilibrium in mixed strategies coordination failure may lead to a suboptimal
institutional network in which the agents “cheat” their principals.
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1 Introduction
A large part of the theoretical literature on agency problems concentrates on
the question of how a relatively uninformed individual (the principal) should
use her power to design both the rules of communication and the structure of
incentives for a group of other individuals (the agents), so as to maximize her
own expected payoff. Depending on the specification of the feasible outcomes,
the agents’ preferences and information, the imputed game-theoretic solution
concept and the objectives of the principal, different basic models have been
This paper was previously titled “Coordination Failures in the Design of Incentives”. Thanks for
useful comments are due to two anonymous referees and to seminar audiences at the University of
Vienna and at Northwestern University. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.
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applied to a great variety of contexts. Indeed, one of the merits of the principal-
agent paradigm has been to show that such diverse relationships as those between
an employer and her employees, between an auctioneer and a set of buyers,
between a governmental agency and the relevant residents, between a regulator
and a fringe of regulated firms, between a monopolist and her potential customers
can all be handled within the same theoretical framework. On the other hand,
the standard version of the principal-agent model, as it stands, may not provide
an adequate description for some of these relationships in which case it needs to
be modified appropriately, of course.
In some applications, there is indeed a single individual who has the power
to choose the rules which maximize her expected utility, when the reaction cor-
respondences of agents derived from their objective functions and the imputed
equilibrium concept are given. In other applications, there is no single central
planner, but one can imagine ex ante negotiations between uninformed players to
have lead to an outcome which looks as if it were designed by a single individual
with well defined goals.1 It is not very rare, however, that the standard approach
to mechanism design is applied to situations in which it is not clear at all why
the institutional arrangements which determine the incentives for a given set of
players should exhibit the same features as those derived under the single-planner
assumption. One can cite the literature on relative performance evaluation and
remuneration for top managers in large publicly held corporations as an example
for such an application. Virtually all of the theoretical literature concerned with
this issue works under the single-planner assumption. The formal results derived
from the model under this assumption are then applied to situations in which
the incentives for different agents are determined by different principals through
heuristic arguments.
This paper is a deviation from the single-planner paradigm. It studies a simple
model in which the institutional arrangements which determine the incentives for
agents are themselves the outcome of a simultaneous-move game in which two
principals interact in choosing contracts. More specifically, a two-stage game
is formulated, in the first stage of which each principal designs a contract for
her own agent(s). In the second stage, the agents, having observed the contracts
committed to in the first stage, play a Bayesian game.
The equilibrium notion we employ in predicting the outcome in the first
stage of this two-stage game is Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium. Taking Rad-
ner’s (1980) epsilon equilibrium as the main building block, we introduce a new
notion of equilibrium which can roughly be described as a continuum of epsilon
equilibria which approximate a state of equilibrium as closely as one wishes,
without ever actually reaching it when it is absent. Whenever a Nash equilib-
rium exists in the contract-choosing game among principals, on the other hand,
our Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium (henceforth ECE) simply reduces to that
equilibrium. The need for an ECE arises in our context from the conjunction
of the discrete nature of the type spaces of the agents with the continuous na-
1 One might, for example, imagine that the members of a committee agree on a set of rules of
behavior before they receive their private information.
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ture of admissible contract spaces. The dependence of agents’ induced behaviors
upon contract combinations exhibits jump discontinuities which, in turn, lead to
discontinuities of the same kind in the principals’ utilities. Moreover, natural can-
didates of contract combinations for equilibria are to be sought on the boundaries
separating regions which correspond to different induced behaviors on the part
of agents, for the principals not only wish to induce their agents to behave in a
particular fashion, but they also wish to achieve this aim as cheaply as possible.
In our present model, some focal contract combinations thus turn out not to be
Nash equilibria, but cluster points of epsilon equilibria getting arbitrarily close
to a state of equilibrium. This main reason for employing the notion of ECE also
forms a first major difference of the present paper from earlier studies which use
standard Nash equilibrium to analyze interactions among several principals.
Another difference concerns the way the problem of multiple equilibria in
the agents’ game is dealt with. Many authors restrict their attention to incentive-
compatible contracts only and thus ignore the problem of multiple equilibria.
This amounts to assuming that the agents coordinate their expectations on the
principals’ preferred solution in each case. In contrast to this, an explicit set
of equilibrium selection criteria is employed in the present paper to predict the
outcome in the agents’ game. A final difference is concerned with the observ-
ability of contracts. Some authors assume that contracts are both observable and
verifiable, so that contract-contingent contracts are feasible. This assumption in-
evitably leads to a highly cooperative outcome in the game among principals.
Others suppose that contracts are private information to the parties who signed
the contract. This prevents the agents from conditioning their strategies on the
overall institutional network. The scenario studied here is somewhere inbetween:
The agents are able to observe the contractual network when upon to move;
contract-contingent contracts are, however, infeasible because each contract is
verifiable only by the principal-agent pair who signed it.
The particular agency problem studied here can be summarized as follows:
There are two principals, each hiring a single agent. The outcome in each
principal-agent hierarchy is entirely determined by the action taken by the agent
in that pair along with the realization of a random variable for that hierarchy,
and it is independent of what happens in the other hierarchy. That is, there is
no “market interdependence” between the two principal-agent pairs. There is,
however, an interdependence between the informational structures of the two
hierarchies since the random variables for these are assumed to be positively but
imperfectly correlated. An incentive problem arises because both the realization
of the random variable and the outcome in each principal-agent pair are privately
observed by the agent in that hierachy.
An agent’s utility depends solely on his share of the resulting profit, and there
is no disutility associated with any particular decision. An agent’s incentive to
misrepresent his private information originates from the fact that any part of the
profit that is not paid out to the principal can be kept by the agent. Principals deal
with this incentive problem by designing contracts through which the payouts
each agent is supposed to make to his principal are specified. Since agents’
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decisions are publicly observable but profits are not, an agent’s payout can depend
both on his and the other agent’s decisions, but not on profits in either hierarchy.
Contracts which allow the payouts to also depend upon the other agent’s
decisions are clearly superior to those in which the payouts are functions of
only one’s own agent’s decisions from the viewpoint of the principals. Through
the former kind of contracts (“relative performance contracts”) the principal can
indirectly get some information (though imperfect) about the realized value of
the random variable observed by her own agent. This information is valuable to
her because she can use it to reduce her agent’s informational rent.
Committing to the cheapest relative performance contract is risky: If both
agents operate under such a contract they can cheat their principals by jointly
adopting strategies not intended for them. To avoid this, at least one principal
has to choose a more powerful contract which, however, causes additional costs.
This generates a sort of public good problem in the contract design game among
principals.
It is shown that, in spite of the symmetric structure of the principals’ game,
there are no symmetric pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria mainly due
to the fact that one powerful contract is not only necessary, but also sufficient
to induce both agents to exhibit the desired behavior. On the other hand, a
symmetric ECE in mixed strategies exists, leading to suboptimal institutional
arrangements with positive probability due to coordination failures among the
principals. Although the institutional arrangements resulting from the symmetric
ECE in mixed strategies are not efficient relative to incentive constraints, an
improvement is still achieved upon the situation where the principals restrict
themselves to independent contracts without taking advantage of the existing
informational interdependence.
The plan of the paper is as follows: The model is presented in the next section.
Section 3 introduces the notion of an ECE. Section 4 presents the results. Some
related work is discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.2
2 The model
2.1 Technologies
We consider two ex ante identical hierarchies, indexed byi = α, β. Each hier-
archy (“firm”) i is owned by a single principalPi and run by a single agentAi .
EachAi ’s task is to make a decisiondi from a decision setDi . Ai ’s decision to-
gether with the realization of a random variableθi ∈ Θi determines the outcome
(“profit”) x i for firm i according to the commonly known relationship (identical
for both firms)x i = φ(θi , di ), where, for alldi ∈ Di andθi ∈ Θi ,
2 Before proceeding any further, we would like to acknowledge earlier work on problems of mul-
tiple equilibria in principal-agent models as presented, for example, by Mookherjee (1984), Demski
and Sappington (1984), Ma et al. (1988) and Kerschbamer (1994). Although none of these papers
considers strategic interactions among multiple principals (and therefore none of them is able to
explain the appearance of institutional arrangements which fail to implement the desired outcome)
the present work nevertheless makes considerable use of their insights.
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φ(θi , di ) > 0. (1)
The two random variablesθα and θβ are drawn from a symmetric joint distri-
bution r(·) on Θα × Θβ , whereΘα = Θβ . We assume binary support for these
random variables, i.e.,Θi = {θi1, θi2} with θi1 /= θi2. The realization ofθi2 is as-
sumed to imply higher profits than that ofθi1 for each ofA
i ’s possible decisions;
in other words, for eachdi ∈ Di ,
φ(θi2, d
i ) > φ(θi1, d
i ). (2)
The agents’ decision setsDα andDβ are assumed to be binary (Di = {di1, di2})
and identical (Dα = Dβ). For each realization ofθi a different decisiondi ∈ Di
is the better choice; more specifically, whenever{k , l} = {1, 2},
φ(θik , d
i





The random variablesθα andθβ are positively but imperfectly correlated. That is,
definingrαkl ≡ r(θk , θl ) andrβkl ≡ r(θl , θk ) it is assumed that, for eachi ∈ {α, β},










22) > 0. (4)






k2) (k , l ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {α, β}).
We will refer to (1)–(4) above as ASsumptions (1)–(4) in the sequel.
2.2 Time and information structure
The binary supports of the random variables, the binary decision sets of the agents
and the profit functions of the firms are assumed to be common knowledge to all
the parties involved and all share the same prior(·) on Θα × Θβ . At Stage 1,
each principalPi (she) offers a contract to her agentAi . The principals make
their contract proposals simultaneously and noncooperatively. The contracts then
become public knowledge, and each agentAi (he) either accepts or rejects the
contract offered by his principalPi after having acquired perfect information
about the realization of the random variable for his firm. IfAi rejects, firmi
disappears. If he accepts, the contract becomes binding. At Stage 2 the agents
who have accepted their contracts move simultaneously in making their decisions
dα anddβ which then become publicly observable and verifiable. The profit of
each firm is privately observed by the agent of that firm.
2.3 Contracts
Let C i denotePi ’s decision domain, i.e. the set of contracts she can offer to
her agentAi . Each contractci ∈ C i consists of a “decision recommendation”
f i : Θi → Di and a payout schedulegi (·). The decision recommendationf i (·)
specifies the actions principalPi desires her agentAi to choose as a function of
the values the random variableθi may take, and it is also used as a “tie-breaking
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rule” by the agents when indifferences arise. The payout schedulegi (·) specifies a
contingent transfer fromAi to Pi . In order to be enforceable the payout schedule
must be conditioned on verifiable variables. The only verifiable variables in
the present model are the agents’ Stage 2 decisionsdα and dβ along with the
contract-acceptance-rejection decisions in Stage 1.3 So each payout schedule is
a functiongi : Di × Dj → IR, where{i , j} = {α, β}.4 If we denotef ih ≡ f i (θih )
andgikl ≡ gi (dik , djl ), we can represent each contract by a vector











We let C (with typical elementc) denote the set of all contract combinations
C α × C β . The set of all combinations of Stage 2 decisionsDα × Dβ is denoted
D , with typical elementd .
2.4 Preferences
The principals are assumed to be risk neutral. Their objective is to maximize ex-
pected payouts. The two agents are identical regarding their preferences as well.
Their twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, strictly increasing, von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functionsU (·) for money exhibit nonincreasing ab-
solute risk aversion (NIARA).5 Agents’ utility functions are common knowledge
as is the magnitude of their reservation utilityŪ . Both the reservation utility and
the amount of money required to guarantee the reservation utility are normalized
to equal zero:U (0) = Ū = 0.
2.5 Payoffs
First consider the case where both agents have accepted the contracts offered













h ), and a given action profile
d = (dαk , d
β
l ), the payoffs forP
i (denotedpi ) andAi (denotedai ) arepi (c, d , θ) =
ĝikl anda
i (c, d , θ) = U (φ(θij , d
i
k )− ĝikl ) for i ∈ {α, β}. The principals’ and agents’
payoffs for the case where at least one firm gets closed down are obtained in the
obvious manner.
3 Since situations in which one of the firms is closed down are of limited interest, we deal with
the agents’ acceptance-rejection decisions in a fairly rudimentary way (see the next footnote and
Appendix 1).
4 A payout schedule of this form is not wholly comprehensive, for it does not specify what the
transfer fromAi to Pi should be in case the other firm gets closed down. We assume that each
contract contains a small clause specifying that the amount of resourcesAi has to disburse toPi
in that case isgi1 ≡ gi (di1,−) = φ(θ1, d1); gi2 ≡ gi (di2,−) = φ(θ1, d1) + φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1).
Although the specification of this amount is part of the contract design and thus should be left to the
principals, we fix it as above once and for all since it represents the unique level of transfer arising
from optimizing behavior of the parties involved, as will be shown in Lemma 1 below.
5 This assumption facilitates the analysis by ensuring that randomized payout schedules are strictly
dominated by deterministic ones.
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3 Definition of equilibrium
We employ the notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium (ECE) to analyze
the contract-design game among principals. The definition of ECE is in the spirit
of Perfect Equilibrium in the sense that we begin by analyzing the last stage of
the game which we refer to as “the agents’ game” and whose resolution yields
the payoffs the principals will receive in their own game. The principals’ contract
proposals conjoined with the agents’ acceptance decisions upon having observed
the realizations of the random variableθ for their own firms lead to the agents’
game, where the natural equilibrium concept to be employed is that of a Bayesian
Equilibrium (BE), forAi cannot observeθj (where{i , j} = {α, β}), but his prior
aboutθj coincides with that ofAj aboutθi . Below we will give the definition of
a pure strategy BE for the case where both agents accept the contracts offered
under both realizations ofθ for their own firms. EachAi ’s pure strategy set in this
game thus consists of functionsei : Θi → Di . The extension of the equilibrium
notion here to mixed strategies as well as to agents’ games where some agents
reject the contract they are offered under some relization ofθ is straightforward
and thus omitted.
Definition. A strategy profile ē(·) = (ēα(·), ēβ(·)) is a pure strategy Bayesian
Equilibrium in the agents’ gamegenerated by an accepted contract combination


















Let Φ(c) denote the set of all (mixed-strategy) Bayesian Equilibria induced
by an acceptedc ∈ C . Since the agents’ game is finite, there exists at least
one BE for eachc so that #Φ(c) ≥ 1. If #Φ(c) > 1 for a given c in C ,
we use a set of equilibrium selection criteria to choose a single element ¯e(·)
in Φ(c). In other words, we assume that the agents resolve their game accord-
ing to a refinement of the BE concept which will be specified below and turn
out to be singleton-valued for all relevant agents’ games here. The selection
criteria employed are Weak Firm Loyalty (WFL)6 and Payoff Dominance
6 WFL consists of two subcriteria denoted by WFL0 and WFL1. WFL0 pertains to the acceptance-
rejection decisions of the offered contracts in Stage 1, whereas WFL1 is applied to the agents’ game
in Stage 2. WFL1 for firm α (WFLα1 ) is defined as follows: “Take any pair ˆc = (ĉ
α, ĉβ ) of contracts
with #Φ(ĉ) > 1. Note that the decision recommendation pairf̂ = (f̂ α, f̂ β ) in ĉ is a strategy profile
in the agents’ game. If̂ ∈ Φ(ĉ) and ẽ = (ẽα, ẽβ ) ∈ Φ(ĉ) with ẽα /= f̂ α is such that the interim
expected utility ofAα for each realization ofθα is the same under̂f andẽ, thenẽ is eliminated from
Φ(ĉ).” WFLα1 and its mirror image WFL
β
1 are applied sequentially, beginning with WFL
α
1 . WFL0
for firm α (WFLα0 ) is defined as follows: “Given any pair ˆc = (ĉ
α, ĉβ ) of contracts for which the
WFLα1 -refinement ofΦ(ĉ) is a singleton, if the interim expected utility ofA
α under the particular
realization ofθα which he observes is̄U (= 0), then he accepts ˆcα.” WFLα0 and its mirror image
WFLβ0 are again applied sequentially, beginning with WFL
α
0 . Kerschbamer (1998) applies a different
version of WFL1. In that version WFLα1 eliminates ˜e from Φ(ĉ) whenever (̂f
α, ẽβ ) ∈ Φ(ĉ). In the
present context this latter version turns out to be stronger than the one employed here as also will
be noted in Footnote 22 below.
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(PD)7. The reason for applying WFL is purely technical: It helps to avoid a trivial
multiplicity of equilibria resulting from agents being indifferent among two or
more strategies.8 We first apply WFL, and then delete the payoff dominated BE
from the WFL-refinement ofΦ we thus obtain, yielding the final refinement of
Φ according to which the agents’ game is resolved. Henceforth, we will letΦ(c)
stand for the conjoined refinement. IfΦ(c) is a singleton for a givenc ∈ C
the interim expected utility ofAi for each realization ofθi under c is given
by V iA (c|θih ) = Rih1ai
(


















is the unique element inΦ(c). If for all i ∈ {α, β} andθih ∈ Θi we








ci , ēi (θig), ē
j (θjh )
)
. If V iA (c|θih ) < 0 for at least one realization
of θi for at least one agenti , then the individual-rationality constraint for thisθi -
realization is violated. TheV iP (c
i , cj )’s are then defined differently. Appendix 1
addresses this issue.
Having derivedV iP (c
i , cj ) for eachc ∈ C , we now can use these reduced-form
payoffs in the definition of equilibrium for the contract-writing game. Although
the strategy spaces in the contracting game can be chosen as compact subsets of
a Euclidean space, standard noncooperative (Nash) equilibria do not necessarily
exist because the structure of the game induces discontinuities in the principals’
payoff functions. The equlibrium concept used to predict the outcome in the game
among principals is therefore defined in the spirit of Radner’s (1980) epsilon-
equilibrium:
Definition. Let ε ≥ 0, and {i , j} = {α, β}. For any two contracts c̄i ∈ C i , c̄j ∈
C j , c̄i is said to be a pure strategyε-best responseto c̄j iff ∀ci ∈ C i : V iP (ci , c̄j ) ≤
V iP (c̄
i , c̄j ) + ε. Moreover, (c̄α, c̄β) ∈ C α × C β is said to be a pure strategyε-
equilibrium (in the contracting game among principals) iff ∀i ∈ {α, β}: c̄i is a
pure strategy ε-best response to c̄j .
Now let ε̄α, ε̄β > 0, and c̄i : [0, ε̄i ) → C i with c̄i (ε) = (f i1 , f i2 , gi11(ε), gi12(ε),
gi21(ε), g
i
22(ε)) for each ε ∈ [0, ε̄i ) be such that gikl is continuous on [0, ε̄i ) for
all i ∈ {α, β} and all k , l ∈ {1, 2}. We say that c̄i is a pure strategy Epsilon
Best Responseto c̄j iff ∀ε ∈ (0, ε̄i ) : c̄i (ε) is a pure strategy ε-best reponse to
c̄j (ε); and (c̄α, c̄β) is called a pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equilibriumiff
∀i ∈ {α, β}: c̄i is a pure strategy Epsilon Best Response to c̄j .
7 A BE ē ∈ Φ(c) payoff dominates a BE¯̄e ∈ Φ(c) iff for every i ∈ {α, β}
and for every h ∈ {1, 2} : Rih1ai
(






























with {i , j} = {α, β}, where the in-
equality is strict for at least oneh for eachi .
8 The conjunction of “WFL-dominance” and PD into a lexicographic ordering onΦ(c), where WFL
is taken as the primary and PD as the secondary criterion, yields a reflexive and transitive relation on
Φ(c) which is not necessarily complete. The refinement ofΦ(c) we work with here simply consists
of the maximal elements inΦ(c) with respect to this preorder. As also noted before, although this
refinement will not be singleton-valued everywhere, it will be so for all relevant contract profiles, so
that it will make no difference how ties are broken in the case of thick maximal indifference classes.
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In other words, a pure strategyε-equilibrium is a pair of contracts such that
no principal can expect to gain more thanε by switching to any other admissible
contract, instead of playing the one specified for him. A pure strategy Epsilon
Contracting Equilibrium is a pair ofε-dependent contracts (satisfying a certain
continuity requirement) such that for anyε from some open interval (0, ε̄i ), the
respective contracts form a pure strategyε-equilibrium. Here note that a 0-best
response is a best response in the standard sense and a 0-equilibrium is nothing
but a Nash equilibrium (in the contracting game among principals). In the sequel
we will call a 0-equilibrium simply a Contracting Equilibrium (CE).
If c̄ = (c̄α, c̄β) is a pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium (ECE)
and {i , j} = {α, β}, then c̄i (0) need not be a 0-best response to ¯cj (0) and
thus (c̄α(0), c̄β(0)) need not be a Nash equilibrium in the principals’ contracting
game although limε→0 c̄i (ε) = c̄i (0) by continuity of c̄i . In fact, this is exactly
the reason why we employ the notion of an ECE rather than just simply that of
a Nash equilibrium in resolving the principals’ game. Here the crucial point to
note is that if one confines himself to a domain of contract pairs which induce
the same agents’ behavior, then the principals’ payoffs are continuous functions
of the contract pairs, whereas the same functions exhibit jump discontinuities
as one passes from one domain to another of contract pairs corresponding to
different BE in the agents’ game. The reason for employing the notion of an
ECE is exactly the existence of contract pairs which themselves are not Nash
equilibria, but are clusterpoints of a domain on which the induced agents’ BE
stays constant, and thus can be approached throughε-equilibria whereε gets
arbitrarily small.
Finally, givenci ∈ C i andc̄j : [0, ε̄j ) → C j ({i , j} = {α, β}), when one talks
of ci being a (pure strategy) Epsilon Best Response to ¯cj r of c̄j being a (pure
strategy) Epsilon Best Response toci , one thinks ofci as being represented by
c̄i : [0, ε̄i ) → C i (for some ¯εi > 0) with c̄i (ε) = ci for all ε ∈ [0, ε̄i ).
As usual, we allow randomization over finite sets of contracts in a mixed
strategy Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium whose formal definition is given below.
Definition. Let cα1 , . . . , c
α
kα ∈ C α, cβ1 , . . . , cβkβ ∈ C β , let πα : {cα1 , . . . , cαkα} →
[0, 1], πβ : {cβ1 , . . . , cβkβ } → [0, 1] be probability distributions on their re-
spective domains, and let {i , j} = {α, β}. For any ε ≥ 0, we say that γi =
((ci1, . . . , c
i
ki ); π




iff, for any nonempty finite collection {c′1i , . . . , c′m i } ⊂ C i and any probabil-






i )πj (cjs )V iP (c
′
t










s )+ε. Moreover, (γα, γβ) is said to be a mixed strategy
ε-equilibrium iff ∀i ∈ {α, β}: γi is a mixed strategy ε-best response to γj .
Now let c̄α1 , . . . , c̄
α
kα : [0, ε̄) → C α; c̄β1 , . . . , c̄βkβ : [0, ε̄) → C β be such that gil ,st













(ε ∈ [0, ε̄)) for all i ∈ {α, β}, l ∈ {1, . . . , ki }, s, t ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, let
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π̄i [ε] : {c̄i1(ε), . . . , c̄iki (ε)} → [0, 1] be a probability distribution for all ε ∈ [0, ε̄)
and i ∈ {α, β}. We say that γ̄i = ((c̄i1, . . . , c̄iki ); {π̄i [ε]|ε ∈ [0, ε̄)}) is a mixed
strategy Epsilon Best Responseto γ̄j = ((c̄j1, . . . , c̄
j
kj
); {π̄j [ε]|ε ∈ [0, ε̄)}), iff
γ̄i (ε) = ((c̄i1(ε), . . . , c̄
i
ki (ε)); π̄
i [ε]) is a mixed strategy ε-best response to γ̄j (ε) =
((c̄j1(ε), . . . , c̄
j
kj
(ε)); π̄j [ε]) for each ε ∈ (0, ε̄). Finally, we call (γ̄α, γ̄β) a mixed
strategy Epsilon Contracting Equilibriumiff (γ̄α(ε), γ̄β(ε)) is a mixed strategy
ε-equilibrium for each ε ∈ (0, ε̄).
We denote the set of Epsilon Contracting Equilibria byΓ . Formally we have:
Γ = {c̄|c̄ is an ECE in the game among principals}.
4 Results
Epsilon Contracting Equlibria are characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 below.
The proofs for these propositions, as well as the intuition behind them, rely on
a number of observations that are reported as Lemmas 1-3. Lemma 1 discusses
a benchmark solution in which only one firm is active.9
Lemma 1. Suppose there is a single active firm. Then the optimal contract cI
in this firm is such that f1 = d1; f2 = d2; g11 = g12 = φ(θ1, d1); g21 = g22 =
φ(θ2, d2) + φ(θ1, d1) − φ(θ2, d1).
Proof: We first show that an optimal independent contract must induce the agent
to play “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2” in Stage 2. Then we argue that the payout sched-
ule specified in the lemma is the best payout schedule from the principal’s point
of view that triggers this behavior. First note that Assumption 2 implies that if the
θ1-agent10 prefers to accept the contract at Stage 1 rather than to reject it, then the
θ2-agent cannot prefer rejecting the contract rather than accepting. Next note that
it cannot be optimal for the principal to let the agent who has observedθ1 reject
the contract: If theθ2-agent rejects, too, the principal’s ex ante payoff is 0 which
is strictly less thanVP (cI ,−); if the θ2-agent accepts, the principal’s ex ante pay-
off cannot exceed (r21+r22)φ(θ2, d2); but (by Assumption 5) (r21+r22)φ(θ2, d2) <
(r21 + r22)φ(θ2, d2) + φ(θ1, d1) − (r21 + r22)φ(θ2, d1) = VP (cI ,−). These observa-
tions reveal that an optimal independent contract must respect the participation
constraints for both realizations ofθi . Next observe that an optimal independent
contract cannot induce a pooling strategy, i.e., a strategy of the form “e(θ1) = dk ;
e(θ2) = dk ”: the principal’s ex ante valuation of a contract that triggers such a be-
havior cannot exceed max{min[φ(θ1, d1), φ(θ2, d1)], min[φ(θ1, d2), φ(θ2, d2)]} =
φ(θ1, d1), which is strictly less thanVP (cI ,−). Thus, we are left with two possi-
ble strategies for the agent: “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2” and “e(θ1) = d2; e(θ2) = d1”.
Since the second of these strategies cannot be induced by any independent con-
tract, the optimal independent contract must recommend “f1 = d1; f2 = d2”. The
9 In the statement of Lemma 1 and in the rest of the paper the relationφ(θ1, d1) > (r21 +
r22)φ(θ2, d1) is supposed to hold. We refer to this as Assumption 5. It guarantees that the principal
does not choose to ignore the agent who has observedθ1.
10 We refer to an agent who observesθh (h = 1, 2) shortly as aθh -agent.
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agent will obey this recommendation if and only if the associated payout sched-
ule satisfiesφ(θk , dk ) − gk ≥ φ(θk , dl ) − gl (k , l ∈ {1, 2}) andφ(θk , dk ) − gk ≥ 0
(k ∈ {1, 2}), wheregk = gk1 = gk2. Now it is straightforward to verify that the
payout schedule characterized in the lemma is the best payout schedule from the
principal’s point of view that respects these relations. 
We call the contract characterized in Lemma 1 the optimal independent con-
tract and denote it bycI . Note that ifPi offerscI , Ai will accept the contract and
play the recommended strategy. This follows from the relations 0 =φ(θ1, d1) −
g11 > φ(θ1, d2)− g22 (by Assumption 3) andφ(θ2, d2)− g22 = φ(θ2, d1)− g11 > 0
(by Assumption 2), and from WFL.11 From these relations we can also see that
Ai receives just his reservation utility when he observesθi1, while he gets a rent
if θi = θi2. The existence of this rent implies thatP
i ’s ex ante payoff undercI
is lower than that in the first best solution where she would receive the whole
surplus. She now getsVP (cI ,−) = φ(θ1, d1) + (r21 + r22)[φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1)].12
Having identifiedcI as the optimal contract for a principal who deals with
her agent in isolation, the first natural question is, of course, whether the strategy
profile (cI , cI ) constitutes an ECE in the game among principals. The answer
turns out to be no. The intuition is as follows: UndercI the agent in question is
able to command a share of the surplus in the form of a rent. This implies that
the principal would be strictly better off if she could observe the realization of
θi along with her agent. Perfect observation is impossible. But even imperfect
information is of some value. If one principal – sayPi – commits tocI , the
Stage 2 behavior ofAi provides such imperfect information.Aj is, for example,
more likely to observeθj2 if A
i choosesd2, rather than if he choosesd1. This
information is valuable toPj because she can use it to reduceAj ’s informational
rent. In other words, ifPi signs cI , Pj has an incentive to choose a contract
under which the payouts fromAj depend not only ondj but also ondi .
Lemma 2 lists some necessary conditions an optimal response tocI satisfies.13
In the statement of this lemma and in what follows we writeU (gkl |θh ) for
U [φ(θh , dk ) − gkl ]. That is, U (gkl |θh ) is the utility level of an agent when his
private information isθh , his decision isdk and the decision of the other agent
is dl .
Lemma 2. Suppose Pi signs cI and {i , j} = {α, β}. Then the best response of
Pj satisfies the following conditions:14
f1 = d1; f2 = d2; (5)
R11 [U (g11|θ1) − U (g21|θ1)] + R12 [U (g12|θ1) − U (g22|θ1)] > 0; (6)
11 Here we utilize both WFL1 and WFL0. WFL1 is needed to guarantee that theθ2-agent playsd2
in Stage 1 (although he is indifferent between playingd2 and d1), and WFL0 is needed to ensure
that theθ1-agent accepts the contract (although he would get exactly the same monetary payoff by
rejecting it).
12 Throughout the symbolV iP (c
i ,−) is used ifci has a form that makesPi ’s ex ante valuation of
c = (cα, cβ ) independent ofcj (no matter whetherAj acceptscj or not).
13 Under the hypotheses of the model an optimal response tocI exists and this response is unique.
14 As also noted before, a best response is nothing but a 0-best response. The superscriptj i
dropped since it is well-understood.
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R21 [U (g21|θ2) − U (g11|θ2)] + R22 [U (g22|θ2) − U (g12|θ2)] = 0; (7)
R21 U (g21|θ2) + R22 U (g22|θ2) ≥ R11 U (g11|θ1) + R12 U (g12|θ1) = 0; (8)
U (g11|·) > U (g12|·); U (g21|·) = U (g22|·). (9)
Proof. Using arguments similar to those presented in the proof of Lemma 1, it can
be shown that a best response tocI must contain the decision recommendation
“ f1 = d1; f2 = d2”.15 For both types of the agent to accept the contract and to
obey this recommendation, the accompanying payout function must satisfy:
Rk1 [U (gk1|θk ) − U (gl1|θk )] + Rk2 [U (gk2|θk )
−U (gl2|θk )] ≥ 0 ({k , l} = {1, 2}); (SSk )
Rk1 U (gk1|θk ) + Rk2 U (gk2|θk ) ≥ 0 (k ∈ {1, 2}). (IRk )
Among the payout schedules which satisfy these constraints, the one that is





l=1 rklgkl subject toSS1, SS2, IR1 andIR2. Denote this program
by W . In the search for a solution toW , we first consider a relaxed programRP
in which SS1 is not included. Later we will verify thatSS1 is, in fact, satisfied
by the solution toRP . First, observe that at a solution toRP , IR1 and SS2 are
both binding: if IR1 were slack, it would be possible to raiseg11 slightly which
does not violateIR1, relaxesSS2 and increases the objective. IfSS2 were slack,
then it would be possible for the principal to move to another payout schedule
(g̃11, g̃12, g̃21, g̃22) on the line segment joining (g11, g12, g21, g22) to the first best
solution (ĝ11, ĝ12, ĝ21, ĝ22) with ĝ11 = ĝ12 = φ(θ1, d1); ĝ21 = ĝ22 = φ(θ2, d2) which
still satisfies the constraints and yields a higher ex ante payoff to the principal
than does the current payout schedule. Next, observe that withIR1 and SS2
binding, RP is a strictly concave program (the relevant assumptions here are
(2), (3), (4) and NIARA) so that a unique solution exists. Finally, observe that
at the solution we haveg21 = g22: if g21 /= g22, then an improvement could
be obtained by replacing21 and g22 by ḡ2, where ¯g2 is such thatU (ḡ2|θ2) =
R21 U (g21|θ2) + R22 U (g22|θ2); all the constraints would continue to be met
and sinceU (·) is strictly concave, ¯g2 > R21 g21 + R22 g22. It remains to be
shown thatg12 > g11. To prove this, we analyze theFOC s associated with
RP . Let µ2 > 0 denote the multiplier forSS2, and λ1 > 0 that for IR1. The
FOC s for g11 and g12 are: r11 + µ2R21 U ′(g11|θ2) − λ1R11 U ′(g11|θ1) = 0 and
15 There is one major difference in the argumentation: In the proof of Lemma 1, we conclude
that an optimal independent contract cannot induce a pooling strategy of the agent by comparing
the principal’s ex ante valuation of a contract inducing such a behavior with her valuation ofcI .
Here (and in the proof of Lemma 3) a comparison withcI leads to the desired conclusion only for
“e(θ1) = e(θ2) = d2”. For “e(θ1) = e(θ2) = d1” the following contract, denoted by ˆc, plays the
role of cI in Lemma 1: ˆc = (f̂1, f̂2, ĝ11, ĝ12, ĝ21, ĝ22) with f̂1 = d1, f̂2 = d2, ĝ11 = g11, ĝ12 = g12,
ĝ21 = g11 + φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1) − γ, ĝ22 = g12 + φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1) − γ, where 0< γ <
φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1) and whereg11 (or g12, respectively) is the transfer specified in the original
(pooling) contract for the situation in which the agent under consideration choosesd1 and the second
agent choosesd1 (or d2, respectively).
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r12+µ2R22 U ′(g12|θ2)−λ1R12 U ′(g12|θ1) = 0. Solving forλ1 and subtracting the




















Consider first theRHS of (†). Supposeg11 ≥ g12. Assumption 2 implies that
U (gkl |θ2) > U (gkl |θ1) for eachgkl . Therefore, by NIARA,a ≡ U ′(g12|θ2)/
U ′(g12|θ1) ≥ U ′(g11|θ2)/U ′(g11|θ1) ≡ b > 0.16 Moreover, by Assumption 4,
c ≡ r22/r12 > r21/r11 ≡ d > 0, so thatac > bd . Thus, theRHS of (†) is
positive. Now consider theLHS . From g11 ≥ g12 and the concavity ofU (·),
U ′(g11|θ1) ≥ U ′(g12|θ1). But then theLHS of (†) is nonpositive. This contra-
diction proves thatg12 > g11. It remains only to verify that at a solution toRP
the missingSS1-constraint is satisfied. To show this, letcRP denote the contract
(f1 = d1; f2 = d2; g11, g12, g21, g22), where (g11, g12, g21, g22) is the solution
to RP . Also let ċ = (ġ11, ġ12, ġ21, ġ22) be a vector in which ˙g11 = ġ12 = ĝ11
and ġ21 = ġ22 = ĝ22, where ˆg11 and ĝ22 are as defined in Lemma 1. First
note that since ˙c is feasible as a solution toRP but not optimal, we have
that VP (cRP , cI ) > VP (cI ,−). Furthermore, from the arguments in the proof
of Lemma 1,VP (cI ,−) > VP (c̄,−) for all c̄, where ¯c denotes an independent
pooling contract in which the agent is instructed to playd2 for all realizations
of θi and in which ¯g1 and ḡ2 (the transfers fromA to P for d1 and d2) satisfy:
ḡ1 ≥ ḡ2 + φ(θ1, d1) − φ(θ1, d2). Our aim is to show that, for each solution toRP
in which SS1 is violated, one hasVP (cRP , cI ) < VP (c̄,−) for some ¯c. To see this,
replacecRP by a c̄ in which ḡ2 = g21 andḡ1 = ḡ2+φ(θ1, d1)−φ(θ1, d2)+ε for some
ε > 0. Admissibility of cRP as a solution toRP , together with the supposition
that SS1 is violated, guarantees that the agent gets his reservation utility for each
realization of the random variable under ¯c, so that the replacement is feasible.
Utilizing the facts thatSS2 is binding, g11 /= g12, g21 = g22, and U is strictly
concave, we get thatφ(θ2, d2)−g21 < R21 [φ(θ2, d1)−g11]+ R22 [φ(θ2, d1)−g12].
Therefore,g21 + φ(θ2, d1) − φ(θ2, d2) > R21g11 + R22g12 > R11g11 + R12g12, where
the last inequality follows fromR11 > R21 and g12 > g11. By Assumption 3,
φ(θ2, d1) − φ(θ2, d2) < 0. Combined with the definition of ¯g2, this gives ¯g2 =
g21 > R11g11+R12g12, so that the change in the objective obtained by the replace-
ment is positive. This contradicts the optimality of theSS1-violating solution to
RP . 
We call the best response tocI the optimal weak comparative contract and
denote it bycW . If Pi commits tocI andPj offers cW , thenAj will accept the
16 To see this, defineψ(x ) ≡ [U ′(x + ∆)/U ′(x )], where ∆ > 0. Then ψ′(x ) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
U ′′(x + ∆)/U ′(x + ∆) ≥ U ′′(x )/U ′(x ) ⇐⇒ U ′′(x )/U ′(x ) is a non-decreasing function⇐⇒
−[U ′′(x )/U ′(x )] is a non-increasing function.
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contract and play the recommended strategy. This follows from the relations 6, 7
and 8 and from WFL.17 Relations 6 and 7 reflect the requirement that, conditional
on his private information and the belief that the other agent obeys the decision
recommendation ofcI , the agent undercW does not prefer to adopt a strategy
other than that designated for him; i.e., giveni (·) = (ei (θi1) = d1; ei (θi2) = d2),
playing ej = f j is a best Bayes-Nash-response forAj . Equation 7 tells us that
the binding incentive problem is to prevent theθ2-agent from mimicking the
θ1-agent. From condition 9 we can see how this incentive problem is mitigated
undercW . This contract offers the agent who choosesd1 a relatively low payoff
if the other agent playsd2 and a higher payoff if the other agent choosesd1;
U (g11|·) > U (g12|·) helps with incentives because ifAj observesθj1 and plays
d1, then he knows thatθi is relatively unlikely to beθi2 (and thus,A
i is relatively
unlikely to choosed2), and so he is unlikely to suffer the “penalty”g12; but if
Aj observesθj2 and behaves as if he had observedθ
j
1 the penaltyg12 is more
likely. This “screening by expectations” easiers the binding incentive problem
and thereby reduces the agent’s information rent. As a result, givenci = cI , Pj ’s
ex ante payoff undercW is higher than that undercI : V jP (c
W , cI ) > V jP (c
I ,−).
In the situation just considered the behavior of one agent produces an infor-
mational externality which enables the principal of the other hierarchy to take
advantage of the correlation between the random variables. Clearly, both princi-
pals would prefer to signcW provided that the players in the other firm commit
to cI . A natural next question therefore is whether the contract pair (cW , cI ) (or
its mirror image) constitutes an ECE in the game among principals.
Again the answer is no, and the intuition seems to be clear. NowcW induces
the agent who has accepted it to play the perfectly revealing strategy “e(θ1) = d1;
e(θ2) = d2” as a Bayes-Nash response to the same strategy chosen by the agent
undercI . SincecW is the best response tocI and sincecI and cW induce the
same behavior in the agents’ game, one might think thatcW should be a best
response tocW , too.
However, the matter is somewhat more complicated. If both principals com-
mit to cW , the constraints in the resulting game ensure that playing the recom-
mended separating strategies forms aBE in the agents’ game. However, there
is also another BE of this game in whichei (·) = d1 for eachθi ∈ Θi and each
i ∈ {α, β}, that is, in which each agent always acts as if he had observedθi1. To
see that these strategies form an equilibrium, first remember thatcW hasg12 > g11
and g21 = g22. Hence, using 6,U (g11|θ1) > R11 U (g11|θ1) + R12 U (g12|θ1) >
U (g21|θ1). Similarly, U (g11|θ2) > R21 U (g11|θ2) + R22 U (g12|θ2) = U (g21|θ2),
where the equality follows from Eqs. 7 and 9. From these relations we can also
see that the utility of each agent at eachθi -realization goes strictly up upon mov-
ing from the recommended to the “undesired” BE. Thus, given the assumption of
Payoff Dominance, the agents will focus on the latter. Since the principals could
17 Under the contract combination (cI , cW ) WFLα1 is used to eliminate the BE “e
α(·) = eβ (·) =
(e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d1)” and WFL
β
1 to eliminate the BE “e
α(·) = (e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2); eβ (·) =
(e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d1).”
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improve their position by raisingg11 without causing any quittings, (cW , cW )
cannot form an ECE.18
The question therefore remains: What isPi ’s (epsilon) best response tocW ?
Lemma 3 deals with this question:
Lemma 3. Suppose Pj signs cW . For any Epsilon Best Response c̄i : [0, ε̄) → C i
(where ε̄ > 0) of P i to cW , c̄i (0) = (f1, f2, g11, g12, g21, g22) satisfies conditions 5,
6 and 8 of Lemma 2 and
U (g21|θ2) = U (g11|θ2) > U (g12|θ2) = U (g22|θ2). (10)
Moreover, there exists an Epsilon Best Response c̃i : [0, ε̃) → C i (with ε̃ > 0) of
P i to cW of the form
c̃i (ε) = (f̃1, f̃2, g̃11, g̃12, g̃21 − ε, g̃22 − ε)
for each ε ∈ [0, ε̃). ({i , j} = {α, β})
Proof. Take any Epsilon Best Response (EBR) ¯ci : [0, ε̄) → C i of Pi to
cW , where ¯ci (ε) = (f̄1, f̄2, ḡ11(ε), ḡ12(ε), ḡ21(ε), ḡ22(ε)) for all ε ∈ [0, ε̄). It fol-
lows from arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma 1 and in Foot-
note 15 that the decision recommendation in ¯ci is “ f̄1 = d1; f̄2 = d2”, when-
ever ε ∈ (0, ε̄] ∩ (0, 12(r21 + r22)(φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1)).19 Since f̄1 and f̄2 are
constant by definition of an EBR, it is no loss of generality to assume that
ε̄ ∈ (0, 12(r21 + r22)(φ(θ2, d2)) − φ(θ2, d1)). But then ( ¯g11(ε), ḡ12(ε), ḡ21(ε), ḡ22(ε))
satisfiesSS1, SS2, IR1, and IR2 (as defined in the proof of Lemma 2) for each
ε ∈ (0, ε̄). So, (ḡ11(0), ḡ12(0), ḡ21(0), ḡ22(0)) satisfies the same conditions as well
by continuity of ḡkl (k , l ∈ {1, 2}) andU . (To simplify notation, we will denote
ḡkl (0) just by ḡkl (k , l ∈ {1, 2}) henceforth.)
Now note that, forAi who is offered ¯ci (ε) to accept this contract and fol-
low its decision recommendation under (¯ci (ε), cW ), one must have in addition
to SS1, SS2, IR1, IR2 that either (a) playing “et (θt1) = e
t (θt2) = d1” for each
t ∈ {α, β} is not a BE in the agents’ game or (b) it forms a BE without
dominating the recommended equilibrium in view of our assumption of Pay-
off Dominance. Remembering that an agent undercW will always respond to
“e(θ1) = e(θ2) = d1” by the same pooling strategy, (a) is seen to be equivalent
to the disjunction of (a1) and (a2), where (a1) is U (ḡ21(ε)|θ1) > U (ḡ11(ε)|θ1),
and (a2) is U (ḡ21(ε)|θ2) > U (ḡ11(ε)|θ2). However, since (a1) is strictly more de-
manding than (a2) by Assumption 3, we conclude that (a) is actually equivalent
to (a2).
We now want to show that there is some ¯ε′ ∈ (0, ε̄] such that (a2) holds for
all ε ∈ (0, ε̄′). Suppose not. Then, for eachn ∈ IN (where IN stands for the set of
18 Strictly speaking, our reasoning here indicates that (cW , cW ) does not form a CE. However, it
is easy to conclude that (cW , cW ) actually is not an ECE either, for one has to consider in an epsilon
equilibrium what happens whenε > 0 is smaller than the difference of a principal’s payoffs induced
by the recommended and the undesirable agents’ BE, respectively, as well.
19 Since we now start with an EBR the limits forγ in the contract ˆc defined in Footnote 15 have
to be modified. Restrictingγ to the same interval asε will do the job.
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natural numbers), there is someεn ∈ (0, 1n ) ∩ (0, ε̄) for which (a2) does not hold.
But then (b) holds for each suchn. Moreover, lim
n→∞ c̄
i (εn ) = c̄i (0) since clearly
εn → 0.20 Also note that
V iP (c
I ,−) = V iP (cI , cW ) ≤ V iP (c̄i (εn ), cW ) + εn
for eachn ∈ IN, since c̄i (εn ) is an εn -best response tocW by definition of an
EBR.





rij gij subject toSS1, SS2, IR1,
IR2 and (b). Proceeding similarly as in the proof of Lemma 2, it can be checked
that cI is a solution to this program. Now since ( ¯g11(εn ), ḡ12(εn ), ḡ21(εn ), ḡ22(εn ))
is a feasible payoff schedule for the above program and (¯ci (εn ), cW ) leads to the
recommended separating BE in the agents’ game for alln ∈ IN, we have
V iP (c̄
i (εn ), c
W ) ≤ V iP (cI , cW )
for each suchn. So, combining this with the inequality obtained above, we have
V iP (c
I , cW ) − εn ≤ V iP (c̄i (εn ), cW ) ≤ V iP (cI , cW )





i (εn ), c
W ) = V iP (c
I , cW ) = V iP (c
I ,−). (∗)
Now let (a ′2) stand for the conditionU (g12|θ2) ≥ U (g11|θ2) obtained from (a2)






rij gij subject toSS1, SS2, IR1, IR2 and (a ′2). Let (g̃11, g̃12, g̃21, g̃22)
be a solution to ProgramS . Moreover, define ˜cS : [0, ε̄) → C i by c̃S (ε) =
(f̃1, f̃2, g̃11, g̃12, g̃21 − ε, g̃22 − ε) for each ε ∈ [0, ε̄), where f̃1 = d1, f̃2 = d2.
Notice that “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2” is the unique dominant strategy for an agent
underc̃S (ε) wheneverε ∈ (0, ε̄), whereas, for an agent undercW , along with the
pooling strategy “e(θ1) = e(θ2) = d2”, it is a best response to the same behavior
of the other agent. Now WFL eliminates the BE wherei (θi1) = d1, e
i (θi2) = d2
and ej (θj1) = e
j (θj2) = d1. Thus, for eachε ∈ (0, ε̄), (c̃S (ε), cW ) induces the
recommended separating BE in the agents’ game.
Next notice that the payoff schedule ofcI is feasible, but not optimal for Pro-
gramS , so thatV iP (c̃
S (0), cI ) > V iP (c





S (ε), cW ) = lim
ε→0
V iP (c̃
S (ε), cI ) = V iP (c̃
S (0), cI ),
20 Note that to talk of the limit of a sequence of contracts each of which is a member ofDi ×Di ×IR4,
one needs to introduce a metric structure onDi as well. We assume that the set{d1, d2} is endowed
with the discrete metric whenever such a structure is formally needed.
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since (c̃S (ε), cW ) induces the same BE for allε ∈ (0, ε̄) which coincides with the
BE induced by (˜cS (ε), cI ) for all ε ∈ [0, ε̄).21 Thus, there exists some ¯ε′′ ∈ (0, ε̄)
such thatV iP (c̃
S (ε), cW ) > V iP (c
I ,−) for all ε ∈ (0, ε̄′′). Choose and fix some
ε0 ∈ (0, ε̄′′) and setδ = 12(V iP (c̃S (ε0), cW ) − V iP (cI ,−)) > 0. So,V iP (cI ,−) + δ <
V iP (c̃
S (ε0), cW ). Moreover, because of (∗), there is some sufficiently largen so
that V iP (c̄
i (εn ), cW ) − V iP (cI ,−) < δ2 and εn < δ2 . But then V iP (c̄i (εn ), cW ) −
V iP (c
I ,−) + εn < δ < V iP (c̃S (ε0), cW ) − V iP (cI ,−), i.e. V iP (c̄i (εn ), cW ) + εn <
V iP (c̃
S (ε0), cW ), contradicting that ¯ci (εn ) is an εn -best response tocW . Thus,
there is some ¯ε′ ∈ (0, ε̄] such that (a2) holds under (¯ci (ε), cW ) for all ε ∈ (0, ε̄′).
Thus, for all suchε,
U (ḡ21(ε)|θ2) > U (ḡ11(ε)|θ2),
implying that (a ′2), i.e., U (ḡ21|θ2) ≥ U (ḡ11|θ2), holds by continuity of ¯g21(ε),
ḡ11(ε) andU .
In summary, ( ¯g11, ḡ12, ḡ21, ḡ22) satisfiesSS1, SS2, IR1, IR2 and (a ′2), i.e., it is
feasible for ProgramS . Now since (¯ci (ε), cW ) induces the same separating BE in
the agents’ game for allε ∈ (0, ε̄′) which coincides with the BE induced under




i (ε), cW ) = V iP (c̄
i (0), cI ).
Finally, the above limit is equal to Sup
ci ∈C i
V iP (c
i , cW ) since c̄i is an EBR tocW .
Since alsoV iP (c̄





rij ḡij , we conclude that ( ¯g11, ḡ12, ḡ21, ḡ22) is a
solution to ProgramS .
To show that a solution to ProgramS satisfies the conditions specified in this
lemma, we first consider a relaxed versionRV of this program in whichSS1 is not
included. We then verify thatSS1 is also satisfied by a solution toRV . Proceeding
similarly as in the proof of Lemma 2, it is seen thatIR1 and SS2 are binding.
Note that, if we also exclude (a ′2), RV reduces to ProgramRP considered in
the proof of Lemma 2 a solution of which satisfiesU (g11|θ2) > U (g12|θ2) and
U (g21|θ2) = U (g22|θ2). These conjoined withSS2, however, imply that such a
solution violates (a ′2), leading to the conclusion that (a
′
2) is also binding inRV .
From SS2 and (a ′2) binding we getU (g21|θ2) = U (g11|θ2) and U (g22|θ2) =
U (g12|θ2) for a solution (g11, g12, g21, g22) to RV . To prove thatU (g21|·) >
U (g22|·), we use theFOC s associated withRV . Denoting the multiplier for
(a2) by a, for SS2 by µ2 and forIR2 by λ2, we getr21 − (µ2R21 + a)U ′(g21|θ2) −
λ2R21U ′(g21|θ2) = 0 andr22 − µ2R22U ′(g22|θ2) − λ2R22U ′(g22|θ2) = 0. Solving
for λ2 and subtracting the second equation from the first yields 1/U ′(g21|θ2) −
21 Here it is important to notice thatV iP is not continuous at each point of its domainC
i ×C j , one
such particular point of discontinuity being the contract pair (˜cS (0), cW ). However,V iP is continuous
on any subdomain consisting of contract pairs which induce one and the same BE in the agents’
game. Moreover, since the dependence ofV iP (c
i , cj ) upon cj is only through the rolecj plays in
determining the agents’ BE, we have that lim
ε→0
V iP (c̃
S (ε), cW ) is equal toV iP (c̃
S (0), cI ) and not equal
to V iP (c̃
S (0), cW ).
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1/U ′(g22|θ2) = a/r21. The RHS of this equation is positive. For the LHS to be
positive, we must haveg22 > g21. It remains to be shown that the missingSS1 con-
straint is satisfied. Using Assumption 3 and the fact thatU (g2k |θ2) = U (g1k |θ2)
for k ∈ {1, 2}, we get U (g1k |θ1) > U (g2k |θ1) for k ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore,
R11U (g11|θ1) + R12U (g12|θ1) > R11U (g21|θ1) + R12U (g22|θ1). This completes the
proof of the first part of the lemma specifying conditions any EBR ¯ci to cW
satisfies.
Now regarding the existence of an EBR tocW of the desired form, we claim
that c̃S : [0, ε̄) → C i introduced in the first part of the proof forms such an EBR
to cW . We already know that (˜cS (ε), cW ) induces the recommended separating
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i , cW ) − ε ≥ V iP (ĉi , cW ) − ε. So, c̃S (ε) is anε-best response of
Pi to cW of the desired form since the continuity requirement is also clearly met
by c̃S . 
The Epsilon Best Response tocW defined in Lemma 3 is denoted bycS .22
Moreover, for anyε ∈ (0, ε̃) the associatedε-best response tocW is termed
an optimal strong comparative contract and denoted bycS (ε). If Pj signs cW
andPi offers cS (ε), thenAi will accept the contract and play the recommended
strategy. This follows from condition 8 conjoined with the fact that properties
6 and 10 together imply that playing “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2” is a dominant
strategy for an agent undercS (0) and the unique dominant strategy undercS (ε)
with ε > 0 sufficiently small, and from WFL. Notice that the payouts from the
agent undercS (ε) depend on the decisions made by the other agent whatever the
behavior of the agent undercS (ε) is (g11 /= g12; g21 /= g22). Roughly speaking the
structure of payouts undercS (ε) is such that the agent is not only “penalized”
for signallingθ1 (by choosingd1) when the other agent choosesd2 [U (g11|·) >
U (g12|·)], but also “rewarded” for signallingθ2 (by choosingd2) as a response
to d1 [U (g21 − ε|·) > U (g22 − ε|·)]. The reward for choosingd2 when the other
agent choosesd1 is designed in such a way that an agent who observesθ2 and
expects the other agent to always behave as if he had observedθ1 has positive
22 The reason for resorting to the notion of an Epsilon Best Response (rather than an ordinary best
response) is as follows: UndercS (0) playing the recommended strategy is adominant strategy for
the agent under consideration. Since the same strategy is a best response for the agent undercW , the
profile “eα(·) = eβ (·) = (e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2)” forms a BE under (cW , cS (0)). However, as before,
there is the BE in whichei (·) = d1 for all i ∈ {α, β} andθi ∈ Θi . Again, this latter solution leaves
eachθi -realization of each agent strictly better off relative to the recommended one.Pi can avoid
the undesired BE by sweetening her strategy recommendation just a bit, so as to preventAi from
being indifferent among several dominant strategies. SincePi has a continuous action space, and
since an arbitrarily small amount suffices to solve the indifference problem,Pi can get arbitrarily
close to – but cannot achieve – her best response tocW . Note that the alternative version ofWFL1
defined in Footnote 6 above eliminates the undesired BE under (cW , cS (0)). So with that version an
ordinary best reply would exist and it would be unique.
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incentives for obeying the recommendationf2 = d2 [U (g21 − ε|θ2) > U (g11|θ2)].
This eliminates the attraction for the agents of jointly adopting strategies other
than those intended for them.
Before proceeding it is useful to record a relation between theVP ’s for
different contract combinations. Since the program leading tocS (0) is more re-
strictive than that yieldingcW , but less restrictive than that generatingcI , we
must (in the relevant range of values forε) have:VP (cW , cI ) = VP (cW , cS (ε)) >
VP (cS (0), cI ) > VP (cI ,−).23 Furthermore, since firstly (cW , cW ) leads to a pool-
ing BE in the agents’ game in which each principal’s payoff is a constant;
secondly, this constant cannot exceed a principal’s payoff under an optimal in-
dependent pooling contract; and finally, (by the optimality ofcI ) a principal’s
payoff under an optimal independent pooling contract cannot (weakly) exceed
that undercI , we must haveVP (cI ,−) > VP (cW , cW ).
The fact that the contract combinations (cW , cI ) and (cW , cS (ε)) induce (in
the releveant range of values forε) the same BE in the agents’ game implies
(together with Lemmas 2 and 3) the following result:
Proposition 1. There exist two pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria in the
contract design game among principals. In each of these equilibria one principal
plays cW and the other chooses cS .
In the pure strategy Epsilon Contracting Equlibria of Proposition 1,Pα and
Pβ act in different ways and have different ex ante payoffs. Since the considered
game is perfectly symmetric, it seems natural to look for symmetric equilibria.
This leads us to the next result recorded as Proposition 2. Proposition 2 first
claims that there exists no symmetric pure strategy ECE and then characterizes
one in mixed strategies. To facilitate the understanding of this proposition it
might be instructive to start with a simple example in which each principal’s
pure strategy set is restricted tôC i = {cI , cS (ε̇), cW }, where ˙ε is a sufficiently
small positive number. From Lemmas 1-3 we know that ifPi choosescI , then
Pj moves tocW which inducesPi to playcS (ε̇). But thenPj sticks tocW , which
exhausts all the possibilities for a symmetric pure strategy CE in this simple
game.24 There is, however, a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies: Imagine
that Pj playscS (ε̇) with probabilityλ andcW with probability (1− λ) for some
λ ∈ [0, 1]. ThenPi , by choosingcS (ε̇) gets a payoff ofVP (cS (ε̇),−) irrespective
of what contractcj ∈ C j the principalPj chooses.25 By playing cW , Pj induces
a probability distribution with two possible outcomes: There is aλ-chance for
(cW , cS (ε̇)) to occur, where the agents play the recommended separatingBE . And
there is a chance of (1− λ) for (cW , cW ) under which each agent always acts as
23 The equality sign in this relation results from the facts that (i) eachPi ’s payoff under a given
contract combination does not directly depend uponcj , but only indirectly via the behavior of the
agents that the combination under consideration generates; and that (ii) forε ∈ (0, φ(θ2, d2) −
φ(θ2, d1), the contract combinations (cW , cI ) and (cW , cS (ε)) induce the same equilibrium behavior
in the agents’ game.
24 Since the pure strategy space of the principals in this simple game is finite there is no need to
employ the notion of an ECE.
25 If Pj ’s decision domain isĈ j , then Pi ’s ex ante payoff undercS (ε̇) is independent ofPj ’s
strategy choice, for all such choices lead to the same BE in the agents’ game.
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if he had observedθ1. SinceVP (cW , cS (ε̇)) > VP (cS (ε̇),−) and VP (cS (ε̇),−) >
VP (cW , cW ), there is a numberλ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such thatλ∗VP (cW , cS (ε̇)) + (1 −
λ∗)VP (cW , cW ) = VP (cS (ε̇),−). Now consider the following pair of strategies:
“Both principals commit tocS (ε̇) with probabilityλ∗ and tocW with probability
(1 − λ∗)”. Then, since the game is perfectly symmetric and since eachPi ’s
payoff for cS (ε̇) is the same as that forcW and these two are strictly higher
thanVP (cI ,−), the range of best responses for any principal (to the opponent’s
proposed move) is any mixed strategy that assigns zero probability tocI . Hence,
each principal is ready to play the particular mixed strategy specified above so
long as the other does so as well.
The argument remains much the same if we consider the whole set of pos-
sible contracts. The main difference is thatcW is not optimal any more in an
environment in which the combination ofcW with the distribution over con-
tracts induced by the strategy played by the other principal yields theBE
“eα(·) = eβ(·) = (e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2)” with probability λ and the BE
“eα(·) = eβ(·) = (e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d1)” with probability (1− λ). Thus, a new
contract, denotedcλ̂, is introduced. This contract belongs to a range of “modified
weak comparative contracts”, indexed byλ ∈ [0, 1]. Eachcλ is a close relative
of cW . Both contain the same decision recommendation “f1 = d1; f2 = d2”. They
differ, however, in the payout functions: The original weak comparative contract




l=1 rklgkl subject to
the requirement that conditional on his private information and the belief that the
other agent plays “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2”, the agent under consideration does
not prefer to adopt a strategy other than that designated for him;cW is therefore
optimal for a setting in which the BE played by the agents is fully revealing with
probability one. The payout schedule incλ, on the other hand, is the solution to a
modified program which has the same set of constraints but a different objective,




l=1 rklgkl + (1− λ)g11; thus,cλ is the best
weak comparative contract for a situation in which there is a chance ofλ that the
BE played by the agents is fully revealing and a chance of 1−λ that both agents
choose the strategy “ei (θi ) = d1 (θi ∈ Θi )”. In the proof below we show that in
the relevant range of values ofλ, cλ has the same qualitative characteristics as
cW has. In other words,cλ̂ exhibits the features listed in Lemma 2. Since we
deal here with ECE (rather than just CE), where each principal’s strategy is a
whole family of (simple) contractsci (ε) (ε ∈ [0, ε̄i )), we will, of course, have
one modified weak comparative contractcλ(ε) for eachε ∈ [0, ε̄i ).
Proposition 2. There is no symmetric pure strategy ECE in the perfectly symmetric
game among principals. In a symmetric ECE in mixed strategies each principal
plays cS (ε) with probability λ̂(ε) ∈ (0, 1) and cλ̂(ε) with probability 1 − λ̂(ε).
Proof. NONEXISTENCE of a Symmetric Pure-Strategy ECE. Suppose that there
is an ECE (¯cα, c̄β) with c̄α = c̄β , where ¯cα : [0, ε̄) → C α and c̄β : [0, ε̄) → C β
for some ¯ε > 0. We will show that this supposition leads to a contradiction for
each possible BE the contract pair (¯cα, c̄β) may induce in the agents’ game. For
eachε ∈ [0, ε̄), set c̄i (ε) = (f̄1, f̄2, ḡ11(ε), ḡ12(ε), ḡ21(ε), ḡ22(ε)) (i ∈ {α, β}).
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Case 1. First assume that, for eachn ∈ IN, there exists someεn ∈
(0, 1n ) ∩ (0, ε̄) such that each agent’s equilibrium strategy in the agents’ game
under (c̄α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) is fully pooling, i.e. of the form “e(θ1) = e(θ2) = dk ”
for some k ∈ {0, 1}. Now it follows from the proof of Lemma 1 that
V αP (c̄
α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) ≤ φ(θ1, d1) for eachn ∈ IN. Sinceφ(θ1, d1) < V αP (cI ,−), if
we choose ¯n ∈ IN with 1n̄ < V αP (cI ,−) − φ(θ1, d1), we get thatV αP (cI , c̄β(εn̄ )) =
V αP (c
I ,−) > V αP (c̄α(εn̄ ), c̄β(εn̄ )) + εn̄ , in contradiction with ¯cα(εn̄ ) being anεn̄ -
best response to ¯cβ(εn̄ ). Therefore, for all sufficiently smallε in (0, ε̄), the BE in
the agents’ game cannot consist of pooling strategies. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that this is the case for allε in (0, ε̄).
Case 2. Now suppose that, for eachn ∈ IN, there exists someεn ∈ (0, 1n ) ∩
(0, ε̄) such that the strategies at the BE of the induced agents’ game are fully
revealing. It is easy to see that any revealing strategy combination (eα, eβ) except
for the one whereei (θk ) = dk for all i ∈ {α, β}, k ∈ {1, 2} cannot be induced
under any ECE (¯cα(ε), c̄β(ε)) whenε is sufficiently small which we can without
loss of generality assume to be already the case for allε ∈ (0, ε̄). But then ¯gkl (εn )
(k , l ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ IN) satisfiesSS1, SS2, IR1, IR2 and (a2). By continuity of ḡkl
andU , this means that ¯gkl (0) (= lim
n→∞ ḡkl (εn )) satisfiesSS1, SS2, IR1, IR2 and (a
′
2).
But we know from the proof of Lemma 3 that then ( ¯g11(0), ḡ12(0), ḡ21(0), ḡ22(0))
is a solution to ProgramS .
Now since (cW , c̄β(ε)) induces the same separating BE as (cW , cS (ε)) for
all ε ∈ (0, ε̄), cW is a best response ofPα to c̄β(ε) for each suchε which, in
particular, implies that
V αP (c
W , c̄β(ε)) > V αP (c̄
α(0), cI ),
whereV αP (c
W , c̄β(ε)) is constant on (0, ε̄). Setη = 12(V
α
P (c
W , c̄β(ε)) − V αP (c̄α(0),
cI )) > 0. Since ¯gkl is continuous on [0, ε̄), there is someδ > 0 such that
|ḡkl (ε′) − ḡkl (0)| < η for all ε′ ∈ (0, δ) and k , l ∈ {1, 2}. Now choosen ∈ IN
such that1n < Min{η, δ}. Thenεn < η and εn < δ. Note that|V αP (c̄α(0), cI ) −
V αP (c̄










rkl |ḡkl (0) − ḡkl (εn )| <
η. Combining this with the definition ofη, we get that
V αP (c
W , c̄β(εn )) − V αP (c̄α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) > η > εn ,
contradicting that ¯cα(εn ) is an εn -best response to ¯cβ(εn ). Like in Case 1, this
allows to conclude that the BE in the agents’ game cannot consist of separating
strategies for anyε ∈ (0, ε̄).
Case 3: Finally we will consider the case where, for eachn ∈ IN, there
exists someεn ∈ (0, 1n ) ∩ (0, ε̄) such that the agents’ strategies at the induced
BE are mixed ones where the probability assigned to at least one strategy lies in
(0, 1). The proof that this cannot be the case either is delegated to the Appendix.
Thus, assuming that the BE in the agents’ game are symmetric by focal point
considerations, this completes the proof of the nonexistence of symmetric pure
strategy ECE.
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EXISTENCE of a Symmetric Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium in Mixed
Strategies. The proof is devided into four steps.
Step 1. In the first step we introduce a range of modified weak comparative
contracts, each indexed byλ ∈ [0, 1]. Each contract in this family recommends
the strategy “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2”; the payout schedule (g11, g12, g21, g22) in cλ




l=1 rklgkl + (1 − λ)g11 subject toSS1,
SS2, IR1, and IR2 (as defined in the proof of Lemma 2) and toIRx defined as
the constraintU (g11|θ1) ≥ 0. We denote this program byW (λ) and the maximal
value of the objective function for a givenλ by M (λ).
Step 2. Next we search, for eachε ∈ (0, ε̄), with ε̄ = (r21 + r22)[φ(θ2, d2) −
φ(θ2, d1)], for a numberλ(ε) ∈ (0, 1) such thatM (λ(ε)) = VP (cS (ε), cW ). First
we have to show that such aλ exists. This is easily verified: Ifλ = 1, the
objective in the programW (λ) is the same as that in the programS . Since the
optimal solution toS is feasible as a solution toW (λ), but not optimal, we have
M (1)VP (cS (0), cI ) > VP (cS (ε), cI ) = VP (cS (ε), cW ).26 If λ = 0, the program
W (λ) boils down to the problem of designing a payout schedule for an optimal
independent pooling contract in whichf (·) = d1 for eachθ. From the arguments
in the proof of Lemma 1, we know that the ex ante payoff of a principal under
such a contract isφ(θ1, d1). Since, for ε < (r21 + r22)[φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1)],
VP (cS (ε), cW ) > φ(θ1, d1) we haveVP (cS (ε), cW ) > M (0). To complete the
proof for the existence it remains to be demonstrated thatM (λ) is continuous.
This follows from the Theorem of the Maximum of Berge (1963). To guarantee
uniqueness, it will suffice to also show thatM (λ) is strictly increasing in the
relevant range. To see this, first note that the component of the objective function
that relates to 1− λ can never exceedφ(θ1, d1) < VP (cI ,−). Thus, in that range
of λ where M (λ) ≥ VP (cI ,−), the component of the objective function that
relates toλ must strictly exceed the component that relates to 1− λ. Since the
λ-component obtains more and the (1−λ)-component less weight ifλ increases,
and since it is always possible not to adapt theλ- and (1− λ)-parts,M (λ) must
increase inλ in this range. We therefore conclude: For eachε ∈ (0, ε̄), with
ε̄ = (r21 + r22)[φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1)], the conditionM (λ) = VP (cS (ε), cW ) defines
a uniqueλ in (0, 1). We denote thisλ by λ̂(ε) and the accompanying modified
weak comparative contract bycλ̂(ε).
Step 3. Now we claim that the payout schedule incλ̂(ε) has the properties
listed in Lemma 2. To show this, we examine a relaxed version ofW (λ) in which
SS1 andIRx are not included and go step by step the same way as in the proof of
Lemma 2. All the arguments continue to hold, except one:g12 > g11 cannot be
proved by analyzing theFOC s. Here the proof is by contradiction: Suppose that
g21 = g22 but g11 ≥ g12. Then we could define a new payout schedule in which
g11 andg12 are replaced by ¯g1, where ¯g1 is such thatU (ḡ1|θ1) = R11 U (g11|θ1) +
R12 U (g12|θ1). The definition of ¯g1 guarantees thatIR1 is maintained. ThatSS2
is satisfied can be seen from the sequenceR21 U (g21|θ2) + R22 U (g22|θ2) ≥
26 To see this, observe that the programsW , W (1) andS differ only in the constraints. The least
restricted program isW . Since the optimal solution toW hasg12 > g11, it is also a solution toW (1).
Since it violates (a2) – as defined in the proof of Lemma 3 – it is not asolution toS .
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R21 U (g11|θ2)+R22 U (g12|θ2) ≥ R11 U (g11|θ2)+R12 U (g12|θ2) ≥ U (ḡ1|θ2), where
the first inequality follows from the original payout schedule being feasible, the
second fromg11 ≥ g12 and R11 > R21, and the last from the definition of
ḡ1 and NIARA. Moreover, sinceU (·) is strictly increasing and concave, ¯g1 ≥
R11g11 + R12g12, so that that component of the objective function that relates to
λ is improved. The new payout schedule is a feasible solution to the program
defined in the proof of Lemma 1. The maximal value of the objective function
in this program isVP (cI ,−). So under the original payout schedule the value
of the λ-part of the objective function inW (λ) must have been (weakly) less
thanVP (cI ,−). By the arguments in Step 2 the value of the (1− λ)-part of the
objective function inW (λ) can never exceedVP (cI ,−). But then the sum of the
two parts could not have beenM (λ̂(ε)) = VP (cS (ε), cW ) > VP (cI ,−). It remains
only to be verified that at the solution to the relaxed programSS1 and IRx are
satisfied. The argument forSS1 is the same as that in the proof of Lemma 2.
And from U (g11|·) > U (g12|·) andIR1 it follows that U (g11|θ1) > 0, so thatIRx
holds as a strict inequality.
Step 4. We now complete the proof by showing that ( ¯γα, γ̄β) is a mixed
strategy ECE with ¯γα = γ̄β = ((cS , cλ̂); {π̂[ε]|ε ∈ (0, ε̄)}), wherecλ̂(ε) = cλ̂(ε),
π̂[ε](cS (ε)) = λ̂(ε) and π̂[ε](cλ̂(ε)) = 1 − λ̂(ε) for eachε ∈ [0, ε̄). Let {i , j} =
{α, β}, and take anyε ∈ (0, ε̄). Now V jP (cS (ε), γ̄i (ε)) = λ̂(ε)V jP (cS (ε), cS (ε)) +
(1− λ̂(ε))V jP (cS (ε), cλ̂(ε)). Sincecλ̂(ε) satisfies the properties of Lemma 2, it fol-
lows directly from the proof Lemma 3 that the same BE, where both agents
play “e(θ1) = d1, e(θ2) = d2”, is induced under both (cS (ε), cW ) and (cS (ε), cλ̂(ε)).
Moreover, by construction ofcS , the same equilibrium strategies are induced
as the unique dominant strategies of both agents under (cS (ε), cS (ε)). Thus,
V jP (c
S (ε), cS (ε)) = V jP (c
S (ε), cλ̂(ε)) = V jP (c
S (ε), cW ), so thatV jP (c
S (ε), γ̄i (ε)) =
V jP (c
S (ε), cW ).
To computeV jP (c
λ̂(ε), γ̄i (ε)), first note that the separating BE, where both
agents play “e(θ1) = d1, e(θ2) = d2”, is induced under (cλ̂(ε), cS (ε)); and the
pooling BE, where both agents play “e(θ1) = e(θ2) = d1”, is induced un-
der (cλ̂(ε), cλ̂(ε)) again sincecλ̂(ε) shares all the characteristics ofcW listed in
Lemma 2. Denoting the payout schedule incλ̂(ε) simply by (g11, g12, g21, g22),
we conclude thatV jP = (c





rklgkl + (1 − λ̂(ε))g11, which is
equal toM (λ̂(ε)) by definition of cλ̂(ε). Moreover,M (λ̂(ε)) = V jP (c
S (ε), cW ) by
the choice of̂λ(ε). Thus,Pj is indifferent between responding to ¯γi (ε) by playing
cS (ε) or cλ̂(ε), andV jP (γ̄
j (ε), γ̄i (ε)) = V jP (c
S (ε), cW ) for all ε ∈ (0, ε̄).
Now take any ¯cj1, . . . , c̄
j
m : [0, ε̄) → C j and, for eachε ∈ [0, ε̄), let π̄j [ε] be a
probability distribution on{c̄j1(ε), . . . , c̄jm (ε)}. Pick anyε ∈ (0, ε̄) and any ¯cjt (ε).
We will consider different cases according to what Bayesian equilibria are in-
duced in the agents’ game under the contract pairs (¯cjt (ε), c
S (ε)) and (c̄jt (ε), c
λ̂(ε)).
In doing so, we will confine ourselves to the strategies “(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2”
and “e(θ1) = e(θ2) = d1” for both agents without loss of generality since our aim
is to show that ¯γj (ε) is anε-best response to ¯γi (ε).
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First consider the case where the BE under (¯cjt (ε), c
S (ε)) is separating while
the BE under (¯cjt (ε), c
λ̂(ε)) is pooling. Then the payout schedule in ¯cjt (ε) will sat-





S (ε), cW ) = V jP (γ̄
j (ε), γ̄i (ε)). Now assume that ¯cjt (ε) is such that both
(cjt (ε), c
S (ε)) and (cjt (ε), c
λ̂(ε)) lead to the separating BE in the agents’ game.
Sincecλ̂(ε) possesses all the properties listed in Lemma 2 and (¯cjt (ε), c
λ̂(ε)) in-
duces the separating BE, the payout schedule (g11, g12, g21, g22) in c̄
j
t (ε) satisfies




i (ε)) = λ̂(ε)V jP (c̄
j
t (ε), c






rklgkl ≤ V jP (cS (0), cI ) ≤ V jP (cS (ε), cW ) + ε
= V jP (γ̄
j (ε), γ̄i (ε)) + ε,
by definition ofcS . Having dealt with the typical two cases, one similarly shows









i (ε)) ≤ V jP (γ̄j (ε), γ̄i (ε)) + ε,
implying that γ̄j (ε) is a mixed strategyε-best response to ¯γi (ε) for all ε ∈ (0, ε̄),
or equivalently, that ¯γj is a mixed strategy Epsilon Best Response to ¯γi . Finally,
sinceγ̄i = γ̄j , we conclude that ( ¯γα, γ̄β) is a symmetric mixed strategy ECE.
In the ECE of Proposition 2 the lack of coordination among principals gen-
erates various inefficiencies: First, there is a chance of (λ̂(ε))2 at the contract
combination (cS (ε), cS (ε)). In this realization there is “excess control”: Both prin-
cipals employ a contract with a high-powered payout schedule although a single
high-powered incentive scheme (when combined with a weak comparative con-
tract) would suffice to induce both agents to obey the decision recommendation
“ f1 = d1; f2 = d2”. In this realization one of thePi ’s could obtain strict gains
by switching tocW . Secondly, there is a chance ofλ̂(ε)(1 − λ̂(ε)) at each of the
two mirror-image pairs (cλ̂(ε), cS (ε)) and (cS (ε), cλ̂(ε)). These institutional struc-
tures are also not efficient relative to incentive constraints: Althoughcλ̂(ε) is (ex
ante) optimal for probabilistic beliefs about the contract chosen by the second
principal, it is not (ex post) optimal once this uncertainty has been resolved. The
principal choosingcλ̂(ε) could obtain strict gains by redesigning her contract to
cW . Finally, there is a chance of (1− λ̂(ε))2 at (cλ̂(ε), cλ̂(ε)). Under this contract
combination the agents play “eα(·) = eβ(·) = (e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d1)” and some
of the profits are dissipated wastefully since Stage 2 decisions are not optimally
tailored to the environment. Both principals would be strictly better off with a
more powerful payoff schedule in one of the firms.
The explanation for the inefficiencies in the design of incentives implied by
Proposition 2 is basically the same as that for other coordination failure results in
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the economic literature. The key observation is that the presence of externalities
can lead to the existence of multiple non-cooperative equilibria. The multiplicity
of equilibria creates a demand for coordination. With uncoordinated maximization
an industry or economy can get stuck at an inefficient equilibrium even though a
superior non-cooperative solution exists. In the inefficient equilibrium profitable
opportunities from an overall change in strategies (from a coordinated change in
institutional design) remain unrealized.27
Of course, inefficiencies of the coordination failure type do not arise in tra-
ditional principal-agent models in which a single authority designs the overall
institutional network. They are also impossible in a decentralized setting when
each principal acts as if she were alone (with her agents) on a desert island.
These settings are, however, not very realistic: In the real world institutions are
designed not so much to perform perfectly in isolation but rather to do well in an
institutional network. Consequently, interdependences between different agencies
arise and with them a demand for coordination.
Before proceeding it is important to recall that Proposition 1 characterizes two
pure-strategy but asymmetric Epsilon Contracting Equlibria. The coordination
failure result of Proposition 2 should therefore best be interpreted as indicating
a possibility of inefficiency and not as suggesting inefficiency with probability
one. Finally notice that the mixed strategy equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be
converted into a pure-strategy equilibrium by introducing an additional source of
nature-created uncertainty.28 There is therefore noa priori reason for discrediting
this equilibrium with the argument that randomized strategies are a convenient
game-theoretic construction intended to prove rather nice equilibrium-existence
results, but not serious predictors of economic activity.
5 Related work
The pioneering work dealing with models in which several principals interact
in designing contracts for their agents is due to Myerson (1982). Although his
setup is similar to ours in many respects, there are also some important differences
between the two models. For one thing, Myerson (1982) considers a fairly general
model covering both hidden action and hidden information problems while we
focus here on a special hidden information problem. In fact, in our model it
is exactly the observability of both agents’ actions by all the principals which
enables them to make their contracts dependent not only upon their own agent’s
but also upon the other’s agent’s actions.
27 Note that the contract-proposing game among principals is very much in the spirit of the “Grab-
the-Dollar” game. In fact, if eachPi is constrained to pick an element inC α = C β = {cS (ε), cW }
one gets a game which is “isomorphic” to the static version of this game. Dynamic versions of the
Grab-the-Dollar game have been used in IO to discuss coordination problems in markets in which
two or more firms have to decide whether and when to build a new plant or to adopt a new technology
when the market is big enough to support only one such addition.
28 The idea that randomized strategies can be thought off as pure strategies in (slightly) perturbed
games of incomplete information forms the basis of the “purification theorems” of Harsanyi (1973)
and Aumann et al. (1983).
30 R. Kerschbamer, S. Koray
Another crucial difference is concerned with the time and information struc-
tures reflected by the respective extensive form games constructed in the two
models as well as the associated equilibrium notions employed in analyzing
these. The counterpart of our notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium in
Myerson (1982) is what he calls a Principals’ Equilibrium. In a framework within
which both equilibrium concepts are well-defined, Principals’ Equilibria may not
exist, whereas a (zero-) Contracting Equilibrium does exist, as will be exempli-
fied below. The main reason for this is that, in Myerson’s (1982) model, the
agents know only the relevant probability distributions over contracts when upon
to move if the principals play nondegenerate mixed strategies. This simply means
that Myerson’s (1982) game cannot be represented as the mixed extension of a
finite extensive form game; it is rather a genuinely infinite game although all the
basic sets of states, decisions or (pure) contracts are finite. The extensive form
game in the present paper is, however, such that the agents, i.e. the players of
the second stage game, move only after having perfectly observed the outcome
of the first stage, i.e. the contracts chosen by both of the principals. How this
difference leads to the absence of Principals’ Equilibria in some games which
own Epsilon Contracting Equilibria can best be seen by considering Myerson’s
(1982) example for his nonexistence results.
Myerson (1982) considers a model with finitely many principals, each en-
dowed with her own finite set of agents. The sets of states of agents’ precon-
tractual information and their action spaces are all finite, just as also are the
principals’ decision domains. We can now easily translate Myerson’s (1982)
particular nonexistence example which fits our framework fairly well into our
notation: There are two principals (Pα andPβ), each with one agent (Aα andAβ ,
respectively). The two possible realizations of the agent’s parameters of precon-
tractual information are the same and given byΘα = Θβ = {θ1, θ2}. They have
equal probability, and the two agents’ parameter realizations are independent








4 for eachi ∈ {α, β}.
Each principal’s underlying decision domain over which randomization is made
consists of two elements, a separating contractcSE and a pooling contractcPO ,
so thatC α = C β = {cSE , cPO}.29 Similarly, the agents’ decision domains also
consist of two elements each withDα = Dβ = {d1, d2}. For eachi ∈ {α, β}, the
payoff V iP to P
i depends uponAi ’s andPi ’s decisions along with the realization
of Ai ’s state of precontractual private information, while the payoffV iA to A
i
is also dependent upon the other principal’s decision in addition to these. More
specifically, the payoffs are given through the matrix
V iP , V
i
A (θ1, d1) (θ1, d2) (θ2, d1) (θ2, d2)
cSE 6, 1 0, z i 0, z i 6, 1
cPO 5, 0 5, 0 5, 0 5, 0
29 Strictly speaking, a principal’s pure strategy set in Myerson (1982) has six elements if these are
to be expressed in the format of the present paper’s contracts. However, there is no loss of generality
in confining our attention only tocSE and cPO for our purposes here, since the other four pure
strategies are strictly dominated under Myerson’s (1982) assumptions.
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wherez α = 2 if Pβ choosescSE , z α = 1 if Pβ choosescPO ; z β = 1 if Pα chooses
cSE , and z β = 2 if Pα choosescPO . Myerson (1982) concentrates on incentive
compatible mechanisms leading to truth-telling equilibria. This, in turn, entails
the implicit assumption that agents maximize lexicographically, first their own
utilities and, in case of indifference, those of their respective principals.
Now suppose that a Principals’ Equilibrium exists in this game. First consider
the case wherePα playscSE with probability 1 at this equilibrium. Nowz β = 1
for sure and thus, by playingcSE with probability 1,Pβ can take advantage of
the lexicographic nature of her agent’s preferences, for this pair of contracts will
induceAβ to play “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2” with probability 1, leading to a payoff
of 6 for sure forPβ . This, however, makes nowz α = 2 for sure, inducing the
behaviour “e(θ1) = d2; e(θ2) = d1” with probability 1 on the part ofAα, which
results in a payoff of 0 for sure toPα who could have guaranteed a payoff of
5 for herself by simply choosingcPO with probability 1. Thus, if a Principals’
Equilibrium exists at all, thenPα must be playingcPO with positive probability
at that equilibrium. Then, however,z β = 2 with positive probability, inducingAβ
to play “e(θ1) = d2; e(θ2) = d1” for sure. This means thatPβ must be playingcPO
with probability 1 at this equillibrium. But thenz α = 1 for sure which leads to
the behavior “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2” on the part ofAα in which case, however,
it is optimal for Pα to play cSE with probability 1 rather than assigning any
positive probability tocPO . Thus, there cannot be any Principals’ Equilibrium in
this game.
Note that the crucial point here which leads to the absence of an equilibrium
is thatz β = 2 with positive probability ifPα playscPO with positive probability,
inducing Aβ to exhibit the undesirable behavior “e(θ1) = d2; e(θ2) = d1” for
sure, no matter how small the probabilityPα assigns tocPO is, sinceAβ acts
only knowing the probability distribution without having observed what contract
actually gets realized. In our model, however, the fact that the agents move upon
having perfectly observed the contracts chosen by the principals changes the
matter entirely, leading to the existence of a zero - CE in our sense.
Here we consider the case where eachPi playscSE with probability λi and
cPO with probability 1− λi , whereλα = 5/6 andλβ = 1/6. To see that this
strategy profile forms a CE, first assume thatPβ chooses the contract random-
ization specified for her. Now, by choosingcPO , Pα getsV αP (c
PO ,−) = 5 for
sure, whereas, by choosingcSE , she induces a probability distribution with two
possible outcomes: There is a chance of 5/6 thatPβ choosescPO , whenceAα
plays “e(θ1) = d1; e(θ2) = d2”, resulting in a payoffV αP (c
SE , cPO ) = 6 to Pα. And
there is a chance of 1/6 thatPβ choosescSE , in which caseAα plays “e(θ1) = d2;
e(θ2) = d1”, andPα getsV αP (c
SE , cSE ) = 0. Now the expected payoffPα receives
by playingcSE is given by (5/6)6 + (1/6)0 = 5, and thus, she is indifferent be-
tween choosingcSE and cPO . She is, therefore, prepared to play the contract
combination specified for her ifPβ does so. Since a similar argument applies
when the roles ofPα and Pβ are interchanged, the given contract combination
forms a (zero) - CE. Note that, at this equilibrium, there is a chance of 5/36 for
the contract combination (cSE , cSE ) to occur under whichAα “cheats” Pα. The
32 R. Kerschbamer, S. Koray
contract profile wherePα plays cPO and Pβ choosescSE and under whichAβ
“cheats”Pβ occurs with a probability of 1/36. In all the remaining combinations
at whichPβ choosescPO (with a probability of 5/6), both agents do what their
principals want them to do.
The interaction of several principals in designing contracts for their agents
has also been studied in the delegation literature by Fershtman and Judd (1987),
Sklivas (1987), Koray and Sertel (1988, 1989), Katz (1991), and Cailland et al.
(1995) among others. The main focus of these papers is on the strategic aspect
of commitment effects achieved by letting a delegate (the agent) represent the
main player (the principal) in some market or more generally in some normal
form game as part of positive economics as well as from a regulatory viewpoint.
Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987) and Koray and Sertel (1988) analyze
the incentives created by the delegation mechanism for the principals to distort
the maximands they hand down to their agents through publicly observable and
irreversible contracts, and how these distortions affect the outcome of the agents’
game. The first two papers interpret their results as providing an explanation
for the compromise observed between sales- and profit-maximizing approaches,
while the last paper employs the same construct for regulatory purposes, and
Koray and Sertel (1989) questions the legitimacy of the positive approach adopted
by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987).30 Katz (1991) provides a study
of situations where delegation via unobservable contracts matters. Cailland et al.
(1995) characterize economic situations where delegation via public contracts
subject to renegotiation can have precommitment effects.
The main point in which the models in the delegation papers differ from that
studied here concerns the underlying reason for the interdependence between
different vertical structures: In the commitment literature, an interdependence
between rivalrous principal-agent pairings arises because the profit accruing to
one principal-agent structure depends not only on the action of the agent in
that hierarchy, but also on that of the other agent. This “market interdepen-
dence” is absent in the present model. Our principals wish to condition their
contracts on the decisions of each other’s agents as well, only because these
decisions provide information about their own agents’ parameters about which
the information is asymmetric. This “informational interdependence”, on the
other hand, is absent in the commitment literature. Other differences con-
cern the restriction put on the space of admissible contracts, where the as-
sumptions in the commitment literature range from very restrictive31 to very
30 In the delegation mechanisms constructed in these papers, the maximand spaces, the delegation
chain length and the solution concepts according to which the agents are instructed to resolve their
game are all artificially restricted. It is shown in Koray and Sertel (1989) that self-interest-seeking
principals have incentives not to obey these restrictions so long as there is no external rule forcing
them to do so. The institution of possibly artificial rules to achieve efficiency, on the other hand,
constitutes the essence of regulatory mechanism design.
31 Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) restrict their attention to a setting in which the
contracts in each agency can be based only on affine combinations of that agency’s profits and sales –
a restriction which has been criticized by Koray and Sertel (1989), for the principals become strictly
better off by not obeying this restriction.
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permissive32 ones, and the way the issue of multiple equilibria in the agents’
game is dealt with.
A more recent paper in the multiprincipals-multiagents literature is Martimort
(1996). Martimort studies a setting of competing manufacturer-retailer hierar-
chies with adverse selection under the assumption of secret contracts. Like most
of the papers discussed above, Martimort also focuses on truthful equilibria of
incentive-compatible mechanisms ignoring the multiplicity problem. In his work,
all choices made in a hierarchy are assumed to be unobservable by players in
other hierarchies, so that any scope for yardstick competition between agents –
which is the main focus of the present paper – is eliminated.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the design of incentives through contractual ar-
rangements in a model consisting of two ex ante identical principal-agent pairs.
The notion of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium has been introduced to predict
the outcome of the principals’ contract design game, enabling us to appropri-
ately deal with the discontinuities of the principals’ payoff functions which arise
when one passes the boundary between two domains of contract pairs inducing
different agents’ behaviors. It turns out that, in spite of the symmetric structure
of the principals’ game, there is no symmetric ECE in pure strategies. On the
other hand, a symmetric ECE in mixed strategies exists and leads with positive
probability to suboptimal contractual arrangements due to coordination failures
among the principals.
The way we deal with the problem of multiplicity of equilibria here is through
the introduction of a particular equilibrium selection criterion which consists
of the concatenation of Payoff Dominance and Weak Firm Loyalty. A natural
question which arises now is to what extent our results depend upon the selection
criterion employed. We first note that, in the presence of multiple equilibria in
the agents’ game, each subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game actually
corresponds to a particular equilibrium selection. The materialization of each
of these equilibria is again accompanied by the implicit assumption that the
agents somehow coordinate their actions to reach that particular equilibrium and
the principals share these equilibrium expectations when they make their own
choices. Thus, focusing on any particular equilibrium selection gives rise to
similar coordination problems along with the common knowledge problem about
how these coordination problems are resolved.
In our context,some satisfactory solution to the problem of multiple equilibria
is needed. It is true that there is some controversy about the employment of Payoff
Dominance as an equilibrium selection criterion in spite of its intuitive appeal.
Actually, the appropriateness of a selection criterion to deal with multiplicity
32 In the 1987 version of his paper Katz (1991) allowed contracts in each agency to also depend
on the contracts signed in the other agency. With such “cross-contingent-contracts” he showed that
some kind of Folk Theorem could appear.
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of equilibria cannot be decided upon on a purely theoretical basis. This is an
empirical, rather than a theoretical matter. What still can be done on a theoretical
basis is, however, to discuss the robustness of our results here to alternative
behavioral assumptions. Although this is an open problem yet to be solved,
preliminary analysis in this direction suggests that other selection criteria will
yield qualitatively similar results so long as the agents do not play the “worst”
Bayesian equilibrium from their own viewpoint where this is common knowledge
among all players.
Another question is to what extent the results of the present paper depend
upon the structure of the space of admissible contracts. An assumption which is
crucial in this regard for our results is that contracts cannot be conditioned on
other contracts. The notion of contract, in general, can be thought of as covering
a broad spectrum ranging from explicit agreements (as assumed in this paper)
to implicit contracts (enforced through factors as firm-specific human capital,
reputation, equilibrium unemployment, mobility costs) or to complicated mixed
reward-punishment systems which include not only monetary components (as
payments, stockholdings, dismissal related wealth consequences), but also non-
monetary factors (as power, prestige, honor).33 In the latter case, contracts based
on the overall incentive structure in an industry are hard or impossible to verify
even if “outside contracts” are observable ex post.
Regarding the structure of the contract spaces, there are two respects in which
the contracts considered in the present paper differ from those on which standard
implementation theory has usually focused in order to determine the optimal
implementable benchmark:34 (i) Our agents’ “verifiable reports” are not abstract
but consist of real decisions; and (ii) the choice sets for the agents have too low
a “dimension” to be adopted as message spaces in applying the Revelation Prin-
ciple. To see the latter point, notice that an agent’s type in a direct (revelation)
mechanism is a summary of everything that he knows but which is either not
common knowledge among all the players or unverifiable to outsiders. In the
present context, an agent’s relevant private or unverifiable information consists
not only of the realization of the profitability variable which characterizes the
technology under which he is employed, but also of the contract in the rival
hierarchy. The message-space in a full-rank revelation scheme would, therefore,
consist of reports in each of these dimensions. Allowing such two-dimensional
reports would inevitably lead to a technical problem: Since there is no a-priori
restriction on the set of admissible contracts and contracts might be conditioned
33 In a companion paper, Kerschbamer (1998) applies the model developed here to explain some
seemingly paradoxical stylized facts from the takeover literature. There he identifies the contracts
characterized in the present paper with categorical real world incentive systems. He argues (and
presents evidence supporting this argument) that the incentives for managers generated by the
compensation- and dismissal-policies of poorly motivated directors are similar to those created by
weak comparative contracts: managers are penalized for underperforming in comparison to other
firms in the industry; they are, however, not adequately rewarded for outperforming their rivals.
The decision for a strong comparative contract is interpreted as a decision to motivate the board of
directors.
34 That is, “direct revelation schemes”à la Myerson (1979) and Dasgupta et al. (1979).
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on contracts that are themselves conditioned on contracts. . . here is no “natu-
ral” restriction on the sets of types. So the question arises whether it is possible
to construct sets of types large enough to contain all the private and unverifi-
able information that agents might possibly have35. Solving this problem and
admitting full rank revelation schemes would mitigate the coordination problems
discussed above; it would, however, provide no solution to the problem of mul-
tiple equilibria arising under a pair of weak comparative contracts.36 An even
more complex message game, on the other hand, may suffice to stop agents from
choosing undesired strategies, as work by Ma et al. (1988) and Mookherjee and
Reichelstein (1990) suggests. The design of complex message games may be
regarded as an elegant solution to the problem of multiple equilibria in a single-
principal-multiple-agents context. In a multiple-principal context, however, the
extreme coordination that such a design will require on the part of agents will
render the materialization of its equilibria quite unrealistic.
The present work suggests a number of further avenues for future research:
In our model the only motive for signing comparative contracts is the inter-
dependence between the informational structures. If agencies are interpreted as
firms other natural reasons for signing cross-contingent contracts come into one’s
mind: If firms interact in the same market, the market system will cause interde-
pendences. Additional interdependences may arise if firms are linked by govern-
mental interventions or by positive or negative externalities. The investigation of
a setting with two or more sources for interdependences may yield interesting re-
sults. Another potentially fruitful area of research is collusion: The results in the
present paper have been derived under the assumption that agents choose their
strategies non-cooperatively. If collusion among agents cannot be precluded, the
formal framework changes dramatically. In the limit – when agents behave as
a single entity – we end up with a common agency with a two-dimensional
uncertainty, an interesting framework from the viewpoint of design.37
Finally, we wish to note that the reason why we have introduced the notion
of an Epsilon Contracting Equilibrium is not peculiar to our particular model,
but is common to all principal-agent models where the induced behaviors of
agents exhibit jump dicontinuities leading to dicontinuities of the same kind in
the principals’ utility functions. It is pretty clear that this phenomenon is typical
of models where the agents’ type spaces are finite or infinite but discrete, while
the principals’ choice sets form a continuum. In such models, the principals’ joint
35 Besides this technical problem there is the question of whether it is sensible to assume that
(verbal) reports (and not – as in the present context – only real decisions) in one hierarchy are
verifiable by principals in rival hierarchies.
36 Allowing contracts where agents report types along the lines discussed above has similar con-
sequences as admitting contract-contingent contracts. The main difference is that with unverifiable
outside contracts a rent may be necessary to induce an agent to reveal his private or unverifiable
information truthfully.
37 In the one-dimensional case common agencies (i.e., scenarios in which one agent serves several
principals) have been considered (among others) by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Gal-Or (1991)
and Martimort (1996). Single principal models in which the agent observes a multidimensional signal
have, for example, been investigated by McAfee and McMillan (1988) and by Dana (1993).
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choice spaces are partitioned into regions on each of which the agents’ induced
actions stay constant. Now since optimality from the viewpoint of principals
means inducing a desirable behavior on the part of agents through a minimal
payout to these, seeking optimality drives principals to the boundary of the re-
gion corresponding to the agents’ particular behavior they wish to induce. The
point on the boundary towards which the principals converge, however, may not
belong to the region itself and thus lead to different and undesirable actions. It
is exactly this phenomenon which is formalized by the notion of Epsilon Con-
tracting Equilibrium through which a whole family of principal-agent problems
can be dealt with.
Appendix 1
This Appendix specifies theV iP (c
i , cj )’s for those contract combinations under
which the Stage 1 participation constraint for at least one type of at least one
agent is violated if this type expects the proposed continuation equilibrium at
Stage 2. Nothing in the rest of the paper hinges on the exact form of these
out-of-equilibrium-payoffs.
First consider thosec ∈ C for which V iA (c|θih ) < 0 for all θih ∈ Θi and i ∈
{α, β}. It is obvious that under these contract combinations participation of each
type of each agent in the agents’ game cannot be part of an overall equilibrium:
Each type of each agent would have an incentive to reject the contract at Stage 1.
The polar opposite strategy profile (both types of both agents reject the contract
at Stage 1) cannot be part of an equilibrium either: One of the agents (say
Ai ) could obtain strict gains by accepting at Stage 1 and playing “ei (θi1) =
d1; ei (θi2) = d2” at Stage 2; since the payoff function in firmi is given by
“gi1 = φ(θ1, d1); g
i
2 = φ(θ1, d1) + φ(θ2, d2) − φ(θ2, d1)” if firm j is closed down
(see Footnote 4),Ai ’s interim payoffs would beV iA (c|θi1) = 0 andV iA (c|θi2) =
φ(θ2, d1) − φ(θ1, d1) > 0. We propose the following joint-behavior rule for these
contract combinations: One of the firms (say firmi ) is closed down and the
agent in the second hierarchy (firmj ) plays “ej (θj1) = d1; e
j (θj2) = d2” as a best
response to the payout function specified in Footnote 4.Pi gets a payoff of 0,
Pj getsλ ≡ φ(θ1, d1) + (r21 + r22)[φ(θ2, d2) −φ(θ2, d1)]. The firm which is closed
down is determined by a flip of a fair coin. Thus, the ex ante expected payoffs
for the principals are:V αP (c
α, cβ) = V βP (c
β , cα) = λ/2.
Next consider thosec ∈ C for which V iA (c|θih ) < 0 for all θih ∈ Θi and
V jA (c|θjh ) > 0 for all θjh ∈ Θj where{i , j} = {α, β}. Here we assume that firm
i is closed down and firmj is operated under the payoff function specified in
Footnote 4. Thus,V iP (c
i , cj ) = 0 andV jP (c
j , ci ) = λ.
Finally consider thosec ∈ C for which V iA (c|θih ) ≥ 0 for one type and
V iA (c|θih ) < 0 for the second type of at least one agenti ∈ {α, β}. Here we
propose that the whole procedure (calculation of a BE; checking whether all of
the agents’ interim-payoffs are nonnegative; if yes: calculation of theV iP (c
i , cj )’s;
if not: repetition of the steps listed in this Appendix) is repeated for a modified
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agents’ game in which types whose interim payoffs in the original agents’ game
were negative are removed and in which the agents’ payoffs are calculated with
the aid of the transfer function specified in Footnote 4.
Appendix 2
Case 3 of the Proof of the Nonexistence of a Symmetric Pure Strategy ECE:
We will treat this case by considering three subcases according as whether
only θ2-agents randomize or onlyθ1-agents randomize or both kinds of agents
randomize. For eachε ∈ (0, ε̄), i ∈ {α, β} and l ∈ {1, 2}, let uil (ε) stand
for the probability thatAi plays dl upon observingθl at the agents’ BE under
(c̄α(ε), c̄β(ε)). Moreover, for each suchε, i andk ∈ {1, 2} set
qik (ε) = Rk1u
j
1(ε) + Rk2(1 − uj2(ε)),
where{i , j} = {α, β}. Note thatqik (ε) is nothing but the conditional probability
that Aj choosesd1 given thatAi has observedθk at the BE under (¯cα(ε), c̄β(ε)).
Subcase 1. First suppose that, for eachn ∈ IN, there existsεn ∈ (0, 1n ) ∩ (0, ε̄)
such that the BE under (¯cα(εn ), c̄β(εn )) is such thatui1(εn ) = 1 andu
i
2(εn ) ∈ (0, 1)
for i ∈ {α, β}. Suppressing the superscript, the sequences (q1(εn )), (q2(εn )) and
(u2(εn )) are all bounded, so that they have convergent subsequences which we
may without loss of generality assume to be already the sequences themselves.
Now, for eachn ∈ IN, set
IR′1(εn ) q1(εn )U (g11|θ1) + (1− q1(εn ))U (g12|θ1) ≥ 0;
IR′2(εn ) u2(εn )[q2(εn )U (g21|θ2) + (1− q2(εn ))U (g22|θ2)]
+ (1− u2(εn ))[q2(εn )U (g11|θ2) + (1− q2(εn ))U (g12|θ2)] ≥ 0;
SS ′1(εn ) q1(εn )U (g11|θ1) + (1− q1(εn ))U (g12|θ1) ≥
q1(εn )U (g21|θ1) + (1− q1(εn ))U (g22|θ1);
SS ′2(εn ) q2(εn )U (g21|θ2) + (1− q2(εn ))U (g22|θ2) =
q2(εn )U (g11|θ2) + (1− q2(εn ))U (g12|θ2);
and
vn (g11, g12, g21, g22) = (r11 + r12)[q1(εn )g11 + (1− q1(εn ))g12]
+ (r21 + r22)[u2(εn )(q2(εn )g21 + (1− q2(εn ))g22
+ (1− u2(εn ))(q2(εn )g11 + (1− q2(εn ))g12].












2(εn ) for eachn ∈ IN by the choice ofεn .
Suppose that there is some sequence (δn ) of positive real numbers with
(δn ) → 0 such that|VP (c̄α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) − vn (gn11, gn12, gn21, gn22)| < δn , where







22) stands for the solution ofMW (εn ) for eachn ∈ IN. Denot-
ing the limits of ḡkl (εn ), qk (εn ), u2(εn ) as n → ∞ by ḡkl , q̄k , ū2, respectively,
(k , l ∈ {1, 2}), let v∞, IR′1(0), IR′2(0), SS ′1(0), SS ′2(0) stand for the relations ob-






2(εn ) by replacingqk (εn ), u2(εn ) by
q̄k , ū2, respectively. LettingMW (0) denote the corresponding program, it is seen
that (ḡ11, ḡ12, ḡ21, ḡ22) is a solution toMW (0). Now it can be checked thatIR′1(0)
is binding;SS ′1(0) holds with strict inequality, ¯g11 < ḡ12 and ḡ21 = ḡ22. Thus, in
case ¯u2 > 0, one has ¯q2 ∈ (0, 1), from which it follows that
U (ḡ11|θ1) > U (ḡ21|θ1) and U (ḡ11|θ2) > U (ḡ21|θ2).
Then, however, by continuity ofU and the contracts,
U (ḡ11(εn )|θ1) > U (ḡ21(εn )|θ1) and U (ḡ11(εn )|θ2) > U (ḡ21(εn )|θ2)
for all sufficiently largen, in contradiction withu2(εn ) ∈ (0, 1) because of
Payoff Dominance. So, ¯u2 = 0. Then, however, ¯q1 = q̄2 = 1, implying that
v∞(ḡ11, ḡ12, ḡ21, ḡ22) = ḡ11 < VP (cI ,−). Now this is easily seen to contradict
that (c̄α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) is an εn -CE for sufficiently largen. Thus, there exist some
δ > 0 and a subsequence of (εn ) (which we may without loss of generality as-
sume to be (εn ) itself) such that|VP (c̄α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) − vn (gn11, gn12, gn21, gn22)| ≥ δ
for all n ∈ IN. But this simply means that (a2(εn )): U (ḡ21(εn )|θ2) > U (ḡ11(εn )|θ2)
holds for alln ∈ IN.






22) ≥ VP (c̄α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) + δ for all n ∈ IN. Now,
for eachn ∈ IN with εn < δ, if c′α ∈ C α is a contract whose payoff sched-

















α(εn ), c̄β(εn )) + εn , a contradiction. Therefore, there is some ˜ε > 0 with
ε̃ ≤ ε̄ such that there is no (symmetric) BE under (¯cα(ε), c̄β(ε)) with u1(ε) = 1,
u2(ε) ∈ (0, 1) wheneverε ∈ (0, ε̃).
Subcase 2. Now suppose that, for eachn ∈ IN, there existsεn ∈ (0, 1n )∩ (0, ε̄)
such that one hasu1(εn ) ∈ (0, 1) andu2(εn ) = 1 at the BE under (¯cα(εn ), c̄β(εn )).
We make similar observations as in the above subcase regarding convergence of
sequences here and will use a parallel notation.
For eachn ∈ IN, set
(IR′′1 (εn )) u1(εn )[q1(εn )U (g11(εn )|θ1) + (1− q1(εn ))U (g12(εn )|θ1)]
+(1− u1(εn ))[q1(εn )U (g21(εn )|θ1) + (1− q1(εn ))U (g22(εn )|θ1)] ≥ 0;
(IR′′2 (εn )) q2(εn )U (g21(εn )|θ2) + (1− q2(εn ))U (g22(εn )|θ2) ≥ 0;
(SS ′′1 (εn )) q1(εn )U (g11(εn )|θ1) + (1− q1(εn ))U (g12(εn )|θ1)
= q1(εn )U (g21(εn )|θ1) + (1− q1(εn ))U (g22(εn )|θ1);
(SS ′′2 (εn )) q2(εn )U (g21(εn )|θ2) + (1− q2(εn ))U (g22(εn )|θ2)
≥ q2(εn )U (g11(εn )|θ2) + (1− q2(εn ))U (g12(εn )|θ2);
and
Multiprincipals multiagents 39
vn (g11, g12, g21, g22) = (r11 + r12)[u1(εn )(q1(εn )g11 + (1− q1(εn ))g12)
+ (1− u1(εn ))(q1(εn )g21 + (1− q1(εn ))g22)]
+ (r21 + r22)(q2(εn )g21 + (1− q2(εn ))g22).





gn22). The same notation as in subcase 1 is used for the limiting constraints, the
objective function and the resulting program.
Under the corresponding supposition about the existence of a sequence (δn )
of positive real numbers with (δn ) → 0 and|VP (c̄α(εn ), c̄β(εn ))−vn (gn11, gn12, gn21,
gn22)| < δn , it is seen that ( ¯g11, ḡ12, ḡ21, ḡ22) is a solution toMW (0). Now it can
be checked thatIR′′2 (0) is binding,SS
′′
2 (0) holds with strict inequality, ¯g11 = ḡ12
and ḡ22 < ḡ21. The rest of the proof can now be obtained from subcase 1 by
interchanging the roles of (θ1, d1) and (θ2, d2).
Subcase 3. We finally suppose that, for eachn ∈ IN, there is someεn ∈
(0, 1n ) ∩ (0, ε̄) such that one hasu1(εn ), u2(εn ) ∈ (0, 1) at the agents’ BE. Then
SS ′′1 (εn ) andSS
′′
2 (εn ) both must be satisfied for eachn ∈ IN. It can now easily be
checked thatφ(θ1, d2)− ḡ22(εn ) = φ(θ1, d1)− ḡ12(εn ). Now consider the following
four cases:
(i ) φ(θ1, d2) − ḡ22(εn ) > φ(θ1, d1) − ḡ12(εn ) and ḡ21(εn ) ≤ ḡ22(εn );
(ii ) ” ” ” ” and ḡ21(εn ) > ḡ22(εn );
(iii ) φ(θ1, d2) − ḡ22(εn ) < φ(θ1, d1) − ḡ12(εn ) and ḡ11(εn ) > ḡ12(εn );
(iv) ” ” ” ” and ḡ11(εn ) ≤ ḡ12(εn ).
Now there are a case (j ) from among (i )− (iv) above and a subsequence (εnk ) of
(εn ) such that case (j ) is satisfied for allk ∈ IN. Again without loss of generality,
one can assume the subsequence (εnk ) to be (εn ) itself. Finally, it can be checked
that each of the cases (i ) − (iv) implies that either ¯u1 or ū2 ∈ {0, 1} which leads
to the desired contradiction along similar lines as in subcase 1 or 2 above.
References
Aumann, R., Katznelson, Y., Radner, R., Rosenthal, R., Weiss, B. (1983) Approximate purification
of mixed strategies.Mathematics of Operations Research 8: 327–341
Berge, C. (1963) Topological Spaces. MacMillan, New York
D., Bernheim, M. Whinston (1986) Common agency.Econometrica 54: 923S–942
Cailland, B., Jullien, B., Picard, P. (1995) Competing vertical structures: Precommitment and rene-
gotiation.Econometrica 63: 621–646
Dana, J. (1993) The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries.Journal
of Economic Theory 59: 288–310
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., Maskin, E. (1979) The implementation of social choice rules: Some
general results on incentive compatibility.The Review of Economic Studies 46: 185–216
Demski, J., Sappington, D., (1984) Optimal incentives with multiple agents.Journal of Economic
Theory 33: 152–171
Fershtman, C., Judd, K., (1987) Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly.American Economic Review 77:
927–940
Gal-or, E. (1991) A common agency with incomplete information.Rand Journal of Economics 22:
274–286
40 R. Kerschbamer, S. Koray
Harsanyi, J. (1973) Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed strategy
equilibrium points.International Journal of Game Theory 2: 1–23
Katz, M. (1991) Game-playing agents: Unobservable contracts as precommitments.Rand Journal of
Economics 23: 307–328
Kerschbamer, R. (1994) Destroying the ‘pretending’ equilibrium in the Demski-Sappington-Spiller
model.Journal of Economic Theory 62: 230–237
Kerschbamer, R. (1998) Disciplinary takeovers and industry effects.Journal of Economics and Man-
agement Strategy 7: 265–306
Koray, S. Sertel, M.R. (1988) Regulating a duopoly by a pretend-but-perform mechanism. In: Holler,
M., Rees, R. (eds.): Economics of Market Structure. Special issue of theEuropean Journal of
Political Economy 4: 95–115
Koray, S., Sertel, M.R. (1989) Meta-Cournotic equilibrium in oligopoly: Positive or regulatory theory?
Working Paper Nr 89-01-02, Risk and Decision Processes Center, The Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania
Ma, C., Moore, J., Turnbull, S. (1988) Stopping agents from cheating.Journal of Economic Theory
46: 355–372
Martimort, D. (1996) Exclusive dealing, common agency, and multiprincipals incentive theory.Rand
Journal of Economics 27: 1–31
McAfee, P., McMillian, J. (1988) Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design.
Journal of Economic Theory 46: 335–354
Mookherjee, D. (1984) Optimal incentive schemes with many agents.Review of Economic Studies
51: 433–446
Mookherjee, D., Reichelstein, S. (1990) Implementation via augmented revelation mechanisms.Re-
view of Economic Studies 57: 453–475
Myerson, R. (1979) Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem.Econometrica 47: 61–73
Myerson, R. (1982) Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems.Jour-
nal of Mathematical Economics 10: 67–81
Radner, R. (1980) Collusive behavior in oligopolies with long but finite lives.Journal of Economic
Theory 22: 136–156
Sklivas, S. (1987) The strategic choice of managerical incentives.Rand Journal of Economics 18:
452–458
